Adopting Gender-Based-Violence Legislation, 1980–2015: The Role of Norm Cascades, Women’s Movements, and Level of Development

Kimberly Seida, Candice Shaw, Jessica Kim, Sam Shirazi, Kathleen M. Fallon; Adopting Gender-Based-Violence Legislation, 1980–2015: The Role of Norm Cascades, Women’s Movements, and Level of Development. Sociology of Development 1 December 2025; 11 (4): 309–340. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/sod.2025.2607832

Research suggests that the global passage of gender-based-violence legislation (GBVL) is linked to transnational women’s movements, alongside CEDAW ratification and regional diffusion. Unfortunately, most studies are qualitative, limiting the number of case comparisons. The few existing quantitative studies incorporate both developed and developing countries and do not focus on broad factors further contributing to faster passage of specific kinds of GBVL. Also, both qualitative and quantitative studies tend to focus on the primary decade of women’s transnational activism, the 1990s. Using event history models, we build on the world society literature by exploring the effects of norm cascades and women’s movements on the passage of two types of GBVL (protections and criminalization) in two time periods (1980–2003 and 1980–2015) and across three tiers of developing countries (upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and low income). We find strong support that CEDAW and regional diffusion of GBVL facilitate policy adoption and limited support that women’s movements do so. While the effects of regional diffusion are robust across laws, time periods, and income levels, the effects of CEDAW vary by position in the global economy, and the effects of women’s movement are significant only in CEDAW-ratifying countries for protections legislation during the full time period.

Democracia y movimientos sociales

Rossi, Federico M. (2023), Movimientos sociales y democracia (Temas de la Democracia, 45; Mexico: Conferencias Magistrales – Instituto Nacional Electoral). ISBN 9786078870660. URL: https://www.ine.mx/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/democracia-y-movimientos-sociales.pdf

«El libro», afirma Matías Rossi, «sintetiza 20 años de investigación en un breve texto que responde a una serie de interrogantes troncales para comprender el rol de la acción colectiva en la constitución de los regímenes sociopolíticos». Estos interrogantes, en torno a los que Rossi articula su investigación, van desde las preguntas «¿Qué son los movimientos sociales?« y «¿Qué es la democracia?« hasta otras como «¿Cuál es la relación entre movimientos sociales y democracia?«, «¿Cómo contribuyen los movimientos sociales a la democratización como cambio de régimen político?«, «¿Cómo contribuyen los movimientos sociales a expandir la democracia más allá de sus límites representativos?« y «¿Cómo contribuyen los movimientos sociales a evitar que la democracia transite hacia una plutocracia?« Para el investigador de la UNED, «es un honor y una oportunidad» poder presentar este libro en una feria como la FIL. «Más allá de sentirme honrado por este reconocimiento a mis esfuerzos por comprender el curso de la historia, lo siento como una oportunidad de hacer reflexionar a la ciudadanía. El formato que propone el INE favorece un lenguaje coloquial que acerca los debates académicos a la población. Esto representa una oportunidad, que es la de hacer uso de la responsabilidad social del académico de involucrarse en la constitución de pueblos que vivan en libertad con dignidad social».

The State and the Emergence of the First American Party System: Roll Call Voting in the New York State Assembly during the Early Republic

Rohr, B., & Martin, J. L. (2025). The State and the Emergence of the First American Party System: Roll Call Voting in the New York State Assembly during the Early Republic. American Sociological Review, 90(4), 726-754. https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224251344574

Prevailing theories about the nature and development of the democratic party system fail to account for the important case of the United States. Using a novel dataset on legislators and roll call votes in the New York State Assembly after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, we show that, contrary to existing accounts, legislative parties had already formed at this early stage. Yet these parties did not arise from the translation of social cleavages such as economic or social class into political oppositions, as sociologists might expect, nor were they merely networks of powerful elites disconnected from the polity, as political scientists and historians have suggested. Instead, these parties coalesced around formal issues—structural questions like the procedures for election and appointment, questions whose answer would determine the rules of the game for future contests. Parties emerged, we argue, not because of an inherent need to adjudicate conflicts between sectors of the polity, but because of the organizational affordances of the modern democratic state. Our findings suggest the formation of party systems is an integral part of the formation of the modern state.

Secularism, sorting, and Americans’ political knowledge

Samuel L Perry, Secularism, sorting, and Americans’ political knowledge, Social Forces, 2025;, soaf150, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaf150

Political knowledge, including knowledge of basic civics and current political conditions, is associated with a host of pro-democratic outcomes including institutional trust and civic and political participation. Religion is also historically associated with these outcomes, yet a link between religion and indicators of political knowledge remains underexamined. Integrating research on religion/secularism and political engagement with work on partisan sorting, I theorize self-consciously secular Americans, particularly if they are sorted politically, will exhibit the strongest grasp on basic civics and current political conditions. Analyses of data from a recent, nationally representative survey affirm my expectations. Self-identified atheists/agnostics consistently score significantly higher than religious or non-affiliated Americans on questions about basic civics and current political conditions. Interactions reveal that education helps most other religious groups catch up to atheists/agnostics on civics knowledge, but not knowledge about current politics. And on knowledge of both basic civics and current politics, atheists/agnostics’ advantage is strongest among liberals and Democrats and disappears among conservatives and Republicans. A similar pattern appears for evangelical Protestants in the opposite direction with their scores on both civics and current politics increasing significantly as they identify more with ideological conservatism, but this does not apply to partisan identity. Findings extend literatures on political knowledge, religious/secular political engagement, and partisan sorting by showing that (1) self-identified secular Americans, particularly if they are sorted, tend to be the most knowledgeable about basic civics and current political conditions, and (2) this pattern is to a weaker extent mirrored by evangelicals, another politicized religious group.

Working-class structural power, associational power, and income inequality

Movahed, M. (2025). Working-class structural power, associational power, and income inequality. Journal of Industrial Relations, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00221856251326670

Under capitalism, workers have two sources of power: associational and structural. A vast body of social science research shows that workers’ power—often measured by union density—is associated with lower levels of income inequality. Drawing on a country-level, panel dataset for much of the post-World War II era (1960–2013), the author introduces a model of distributive outcomes that centers on the dual sources of workers’ associational and structural power. By differentiating the sources of workers’ power, the author examines the extent to which they bear on distributive outcomes across countries in the Global North. Using two-way fixed effects regression models, the author presents strong evidence that while workers’ associational and structural power are both statistically associated with lower levels of income inequality, it is workers’ structural—and not associational—power that drives egalitarian outcomes. Notably, counterfactual simulations demonstrate that, on average, structural power of the working class explains a gap up to approximately 4% in levels of income inequality over the past five decades across postindustrial countries.