STATES, POWER, & SOCIETIES

LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

RICHARD LACHMANN,
UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY, SUNY

The ASA meeting in New York saw excellent sessions as well as our wonderful mini-conference at Brooklyn College. I want to thank last year's chair Pam Paxton for all her work in organizing those sessions along with the other work of our section, and Tom Janoski, the previous year's chair, for formulating and organizing the mini-conference. In addition to Tom, Bart Bonikowski, Carlos de la Torre, and Delia Baldassarri contributed much work to making the day such a success. Our section treasurer Stephanie Mudge, in addition to the regular work of that position, handled the finances for the mini-conference. Our newsletter editors, Maria Akchurin, Sara Compion, Nathan Katz, Julia Miller and J Sterphone, and our Webmaster Jennifer Dudley, make essential contributions to the section.

It is already time to begin thinking about the 2020 ASA. I encourage you to submit papers to our section's sessions as well as to the regular sessions, many of which address topics central to political sociology. In this moment of heightened political action in the US and elsewhere in the world, our work as political sociologists is vital. Those who wish to act to prevent

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

catastrophic climate change, to block the rising forces of racism and reaction, and to build support for more humanistic policies are unsure of what strategies —for recruiting allies and for pressuring those in power—will work. We are inundated in the mass media with assertions—based mainly on anecdotal evidence or conspiracy theories—about the reasons for the rise of reactionary politicians. Political sociology actually has good explanations of what makes for effective political action from both the left and right. We certainly have guidance to offer about how to study these questions and what sorts of research can be fruitful. I hope our section, through our newsletter and our meeting sessions and through interactions among our members, can be a forum for thinking about these questions and communicating what we know both among ourselves and to wider audiences of concerned citizens.

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Meet the New Council Members

ANN HIRONAKA

SECTION CHAIR-ELECT // ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

My research focuses broadly on war and political change. War used to be a major topic in sociology. In recent decades, however, the topic has largely been ceded to political science. My work seeks to wrest the study of war away from political science by drawing on sociological theories and insights that can help shed light on military competition and war.

My first book, *Neverending Wars: Weak States, the International Community and the Perpetuation of Civil War* (Harvard University Press, 2005), sought to understand the lengthy contemporary civil wars of the global South.

I argue that structural weakness of states resulting from colonization, together with resources from external actors, result in bloody conflicts that drag on for decades. We tend to think of civil wars as domestic affairs, and much scholarship focuses on the challenges of conflict resolution and trust among local actors. By contrast, I contend that the forces driving civil conflict are often external, and thus to understand civil wars we must look toward the global context.

More recently, my book *Tokens of Power: Rethinking War* (Cambridge University Press, 2017) theorizes the nature of military competition in Europe and the industrialized West over the twentieth century. Wars are often presumed to reflect competition over valuable political interests or limited resources such as territory. I argue that 20th century wars can better be understood as competition for status and prestige within the international community. I explore several implications, such as the tendency for militarily powerful states to overextend, leading to defeat. I conclude that military competition with other powerful countries is not a way to defend against competitors but actually tends to undermine national security over the long term.

I also study political change, particularly international efforts to reduce environmental pollution and degradation, in my book *Greening the Globe:*

World Society and Environmental Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Environmental protection is another topic that has received a great deal of attention from political scientists, who focus on the effectiveness of environmental treaties, policies, and laws (or lack thereof). I seek to broaden the discussion by addressing an array of social dynamics, including social movements, the influence of culture and media, the role of international institutions, and the efforts of corporations and economic actors. I argue that this broad array of pro-environmental forces can have a cumulative effect—I call it the "bee swarm"—which can produce positive environmental change even if individual laws and policies are not always as effective as one might desire.

My work draws upon the sociological tradition of world society theory, associated with John Meyer and others. The world society perspective focuses on social structure in the form of institutions that are historically constructed and that broadly reflect cultural understandings and beliefs. The world society perspective has done much to draw attention to the influence of global norms and culture on dynamics that were previously conceptualized as primarily national or local. World society scholars have typically studied positive or benign international dynamics, such as the expansion of human rights and education. My work has turned instead to the darker aspects of the international community through my examination of war, conflict, and environmental degradation.

However, I am returning to the sunnier side of humanity in my current research. My current book project addresses the prospects of sustained peace among nations of the world. Peace is a topic that has received relatively little scholarly attention, at least in comparison to the vast libraries devoted to war. Those few political science tracts about peace focus mainly on the political negotiations that end wars. Instead, I focus on the broader societal conditions for peace, particularly the development of national and international institutions, which provide prosperous alternatives to military competition and conflict.

I am honored to have been elected Chair of the Political Sociology section. Political sociology has much to contribute to the national dialogue that is consuming American society at present.

I hope to support the growing relevance of political sociology to contemporary events as well as the continuing efforts of political sociologists to address issues of theoretical concern to the discipline and related fields.

MARCO GARRIDO

NEW COUNCIL MEMBER // ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

My work has focused on the relationship between the urban poor and middle class in Manila as located in slums and upper- and middle-class enclaves. The project has been to connect this relationship with urban structure on the one hand and political dissensus on the other. In the process, I highlight the role of class in shaping urban space, social life, and politics. Recently, I published a book on the topic entitled *The Patchwork City*.
My new project draws a link between democratic recession and the explosive growth of the middle class in the developing world. Specifically, I locate the Philippine middle class' support for Rodrigo Duterte in their experience of democracy. My research aims to provide a thick account of this experience and, thereby, clarify the sources of democratic disenchantment in the Philippines and elsewhere.

I am looking forward to participating actively in council business. During my time on the council, I hope to promote more research focused on the Global South and on ethnography as a method of studying politics.

GENEVIÈVE ZUBRZYCKI

NEW COUNCIL MEMBER // PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AND DIRECTOR OF THE WEISER CENTER FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Geneviève Zubrzycki (Zoo-bri-ski) is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Weiser Center for Europe and Eurasia at the University of Michigan. She is currently editor of *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, and serves or served on the editorial boards of *Sociology of Religion*, *Qualitative Sociology*, *American Journal of Cultural Sociology*, and

Sociological Theory. Born and raised in Québec City, she was educated at McGill University and the Université de Montréal before obtaining her Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

A political and cultural sociologist, Zubrzycki studies national identity and religion, collective memory and national mythology, and the contested place of religious symbols in the public sphere. Her first book, the award-winning *The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland* (2006, Polish trans. 2014) examined the reconfiguration of the relationship between Polishness and Catholicism after the fall of communism through an analysis of Poles' and Jews' conflicting memories of World War II, and the international conflict over the presence of Christian symbols at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Her second book, *Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion and Secularism in Quebec* (2016) analyzes the discursive, ritual and visual genesis of a Catholic French-Canadian ethnic identity in the 19th century, and its transformation into a secular Québécois national identity in the second half of the 20th century. Zubrzycki extends her analysis to the present, looking at how Quebec's Catholic past is remembered and transformed into secular cultural heritage. Zubrzycki pursues her analysis of religion, memory and symbolic boundaries in a new monograph on the on-going revival of Jewish communities in Poland and non-Jewish Poles' interest in all things Jewish, tentatively entitled *Resurrecting the Jew: Antisemitism, Philosemitism and Nationalism in Contemporary Poland*.

Zubrzycki's scholarship is deeply influenced by visual studies and the material turn, making ample use of visual data in her work and using theories of materiality to understand the power of symbols in political transformations. Her edited volume *National Matters: Materiality, Culture, and Nationalism* (Stanford 2017) specifically addresses these issues.

Zubrzycki was chair of the ASA's section on the Sociology of culture (2014-17), was a council member of the Sociology of Religion section (2014-17), and served as the secretary-treasurer of the ASA's Comparative-Historical Sociology section (2006-09). As a member of the Political Sociology council, she looks forward to develop workshops and mentoring programs for graduate students.

And in case you wonder, her last name is pronounced Zoo-bri-ski. Much easier than it looks!

Q&A with Frances Fox Piven

WINNER OF THE DISTINGUISHED CAREER AWARD

What major political events have influenced your research agenda over the years?

As an undergraduate, I was attracted to the ideals of the planned community associated with the New Deal, although as I explored the practices associated with those ideals, I became skeptical, influenced at first by conservative critics like von Hayek who argued that the rationally planned community was impossible, and later, when I worked as a junior planner on the rezoning of New York City, for the more grounded reason that these ideals were corrupted in practice by the pervasive influence of the real estate industry, especially in New York City.

However, it was the 1960s! And very soon the spectacular eruption, first of the anti-war movement, and then of the Black Freedom Movement, overshadowed for me at least these preoccupations. Indeed, I think it is not an exaggeration to say that the anti-poverty wing of the Black Freedom Movement has been the most important influence on my work.

How has political sociology changed throughout the course of your career, and where do you see it heading in the future?

It has become bolder and broader. I began my work as an academic in the 1960s, and political sociology was still crippled by the constraints of cold war fears. The movement of the 1960s changed that, people began to read Marx and Gramsci and the English social historians. But it took a while for these influences to transform the field.

How would you describe your research process? How has it changed over the years?

I study politics, especially the politics of the lower strata in American society, and the politics that affects lower strata groups. When I want to understand a political development, I try to find out as much as I can about the historical events in which that development was embedded. I also

search for historical parallels that might cast light on those events. And although I am not a quantitative methodologist, I eagerly use quantitative data produced by others in this process of searching. I don't think my approach has changed much over the years, but the data available has improved!

What is your favorite obscure sociological work?
My favorite obscure work is a public administration tract by Chester Barnard entitled *The Functions of the Executive*. Very informative, especially for organizers!

If you had one piece of advice for graduate students/early junior faculty what would it be?
Shorten your time horizons, not only because we don't any of us know the future, but because life is better if you worry less and do more!

Back in 2011 Glen Beck went after you. Do you have any further thoughts on the experience or Beck in general?
It was bracing, and interesting. And I learned I had lots of friends!

Frances Fox Piven *is Distinguished Professor Emerita at The Graduate Center, City University of New York. She is an internationally renowned social scientist, scholar, and activist.*

Q&A with Kiyoteru Tsutsui

CO-WINNER OF THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY BOOK AWARD

Rights Makes Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2018).

How did you start working on the book and how did the project evolve over time?
The book project started as a follow-up to a series of articles that I'd worked on since my dissertation, which examined how ideas and institutions around universal human rights emerged and evolved since around the 1940s. These articles featured cross-national quantitative analyses that identified some interesting global-local dynamics in human rights politics: many states make discursive commitments to

human rights without actually changing their practices, and only when civil society actors leverage those commitments do actual practices improve. Other researchers also confirmed this pattern, and I had some anecdotal evidence to underscore the argument, but I wanted to have a deeper understanding about how these processes unfold. So I set out to do a comparative case study, and the three cases in Japan offered an excellent setting for this process-tracing study.

One of the core arguments in my research up to that point was that once global human rights enter national politics, ideas and institutions around human rights galvanize local populations and lead them to greater activism and eventually greater success. To demonstrate this process, it was advantageous to have multiple groups with different political and historical backgrounds in the same country, so that country-level characteristics are controlled for and the impact of global human rights can be examined more precisely. The three groups in Japan were perfect for this purpose. Ainu, an inactive indigenous people, Koreans, an active but unsuccessful non-citizen group, and Burakumin, a former 'outcaste' group that had been politically active and already seen some successes, were at different stages of political mobilization but they all expanded their activism since the 1970s, when global human rights entered Japanese politics in earnest. So I set out to do a number of interviews, collect archival data, and put together a narrative that weaves these data into a book on how these three groups have been influenced by human rights ideas, utilized international human rights instruments, and also contributed to reinforcement and expansion of global human rights norms. As I examined empirical materials in greater detail, I came to a realization that one of the most consequential impacts of global human rights is its capacity to empower subjugated populations. I capture this in a concept, transformation of movement actorhood. For any underprivileged groups to start mobilization for more rights, it is critical that they understand that they deserve those rights. This realization can propel them to collective political action, and at that point, international human rights institutions can provide instrumental support, offering forums to criticize the government and to form alliances with other groups that are similarly disadvantaged. Done effectively, the growing activism can lead to improvement in their rights situations and can also result in a redirection of their movement in a more global and altruistic direction.

What also emerged from the in-depth

examination of these social movements is that these local groups not only receive the benefits of global human rights but also give back to global human rights. Initially, their engagement tends to be more instrumental, trying to get something out of international human rights institutions. But once some of their goals are met and their participation in global forums becomes extended, they tend to develop commitment to contribute to the international forums that they received benefits from. This feedback happened to all three groups as they contributed to consolidation and expansion of global human rights norms.

These core findings emerged from data analysis, and the original focus on the global-local interplay in human rights morphed into a focus on how global human rights transforms movement actorhood of the minority groups and leads to expanded activism and greater success, and on how those local groups feed back to global human rights to contribute to the sustenance of the global human rights infrastructure.

How has writing this book influenced your overall research agenda? What do you see as the core themes motivating your research going forward?

Since the book is a case study of three groups in one country, originally motivated by large-N cross-national analyses, it was natural for me to get back to a large-N analysis again, this time to focus on how national law intersects with international law. So I teamed up with my collaborator in Germany to launch a new project on how constitutional provisions on minority rights changed over time and impacted minority rights practices. This project involves coding of all the national constitutions that ever existed, and we are finally done with coding and working on the analyses. To complement the cross-national quantitative analyses, we are also putting together an edited volume that assembled experts of various country cases to write about the evolution of minority rights jurisprudence and its on-the-ground impact in their focal countries. This one-two punch of large-N quantitative analysis and focused qualitative case studies is very informative to me, and I will continue to employ this mixed-methods approach in my future projects.

My other projects include the campus human rights index, which ranks all major universities in the US in terms of their commitment to and practice of human rights; the contours of human rights advocacy, which features big data analysis of press releases of major human rights NGOs; and populism and the future of democracy, which examines the causes and consequences of populism

in the contemporary world. In all these projects, the core theme continues to be how ideas shape social, political action, and I adopt a mixed-methods approach to understand both the macro trend and actual mechanisms at work.

Where do you see the political sociology subfield heading? What do you think are some of the key ways you can that political sociology can contribute to current academic and public debates?

There are some exciting methodological innovations in computational social science that political sociologists should take advantage of. Political scientists seem to have the edge right now but we can still catch up and offer interesting and innovative analyses that shed new light on political debates of our time, using big data, computational text analysis, survey experiments, field experiments, etc.

I also think that established qualitative approaches such as ethnography and historical comparative analyses have a lot to offer, as the assumption of rational political actors becomes increasingly untenable with value issues like immigration, race, gender, religion and so on dominating the politics of developed democracies. Political sociologists in this tradition are in an advantageous position to examine how actors form their political assumptions, interests, and opinions to engage in political action.

As a substantive topic, I think populism and majority-minority relations will be the focus of many public debates going forward, prompting us to think about the essence of democracy again. I have been studying majority-minority relations for a long time, and I sense a significant shift in the way people think of this issue. There is a powerful backlash against the protection of minority rights, which constitutes a core part of the current rise of populism in many countries, even in advanced democracies. Whether the issue is immigration or refugees or gender minority, majority groups are pushing back against according more rights to minority groups, using their entrenched power to stop the erosion of their advantages. Often, this backlash is prompted or fueled by authoritarian demagogues who fan the flame of fear and hate, playing up the threat of outsiders and minorities ending the idealized lifestyle of majority populations. To stem the tide of unsavory authoritarians and hate-filled populism, we need to think again about how democracy works and devise ways to advance minority rights while minimizing the potential of virulent majority pushback against minority rights.

Kiyoteru Tsutsui *is Professor of Sociology, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies and Director of the Donia Human Rights Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.*

Q&A with Stephanie Mudge

CO-WINNER OF THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY BOOK AWARD

Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press, 2018).

What inspired you to start working on* Leftism Reinvented, *and how did the project evolve over time?

The project had at least two inspirations. One is biographical: I grew up in the DC area, in a mainly Democratic community, the daughter of a Keynesian economist who worked for the government starting in the Carter years. The advent of Reagan's election changed everything for me: my father found himself with a boss who had an aversion to the kind of economics he did, shifted to the foreign service, and I went to boarding school. So I experienced the connection between economics and partisan politics, and the way the two things intersect inside the federal government, in a first-hand way. Then, the first presidential election in which I voted was 1992—William (Bill) Clinton's election. So I'm also a child of the third way, or what I call in the book "neoliberalized leftism." The odd liberal-but-not quality of Clintonism intrigued me; where Clintonite politics came from, and what's happened since, became a bit of an obsession. Via my father's experience, I had a sense that it all had something to do with the relationship between economic expertise and Democratic politics, though I didn't know what exactly.

The second inspiration came during dissertation fieldwork on the politics of EU-level social policy in Brussels in 2003-2004, when most member state governments were dominated by center-left and social democratic parties. These are parties with very different histories, and very different historical self-understandings, than the US Democratic Party. And yet governing parties in Europe at the time spoke in a left-but-not language that was sometimes perfectly interchangeable with Clintonism. So I saw that there was something bigger going on--as did many others, of course, but I wasn't satisfied with the academic literature on third wayism, which sometimes felt terminologically

or analytically vague, politically slanted, historically limited, or overly driven by questions parties ask (can they win? are they attracting voters? do their policies work?), as opposed to questions sociologists ask.

As far as how it evolved, well, it is a long book, so that is a long story. Other than narrowing the focus to four national parties (initially operating in a different epistemological mode, I started with 22 countries), I'd say the most important inflection point was my turn to structured, cross-party, biographical comparison. This wasn't in the original design of the project; it emerged partly out of my engagement with field-theoretic thinking, and partly out of my reading of historical literatures on social democratic parties and Western Marxism—particularly, in the latter category, Perry Anderson's *Considerations on Western Marxism.*

Three things followed from my biographical turn. One was a perspective that messed with conventional modes of periodization in the welfare states and neoliberalism literatures, which tended to divide the post-war period into the pre-neoliberal, Keynesian era versus the neoliberal/neoconservative era. When you follow people's biographies, this kind of periodization doesn't work cleanly. It became especially clear to me that explaining the origins of left parties' Keynesian turn—that is, how it originated in the socialist period that preceded it—was essential to the explanation of third wayism. Another was that I became more attuned to the arbitrariness of methodologically nationalist assumptions: the folks I followed moved in networks that were not consistently nationally centered. So actors' national-groundedness versus transnationality became something to analyze rather than assume. A third was a new appreciation of sociology of knowledge and field-theoretic claims that there is a connection between our place in the world and our perspective on it: once I started looking more closely at the self-accounts of historically situated party experts, the explanatory importance of the location-perspective relationship came into much sharper focus, so that I wondered how I could have overlooked it in the first place. This latter sensitivity allowed me to shift from thinking in terms of ideas to thinking in terms of practical ethics or, in other words, from developing an ideational account (of which I am a critic, especially when it comes to the analysis of neoliberalism) versus a more relational, contingent, field-theoretic mode of explanation.

How have the findings you outline in this book influenced your overall research agenda? What do you see as the core themes motivating your research going forward?

The book started as a study of parties and neoliberalism, but what emerged out of it was an overriding concern with representation and representational struggles in public life. By "representation" I mean the ways that power-seekers and power-holders perceive, interpret, and speak for the interests and needs of people, places, and things, and then build modes of political (or antipolitical) action on that basis.

Along these lines, I remain very much interested in the internal dynamics of political parties, and how those dynamics can make all the difference between meaningful representation and representation in-name-only. I think there is still more to know about the consequences of neoliberal politics, in which parties came to represent no one in particular—except possibly their own interests in winning elections—and, at the same time, seem to have lost any capacity to recognize this fact. This, in a nutshell, is what I think happened in center-left politics starting in the 1980s and 1990s: dominant elites became increasingly concerned with the demands of markets and winning electoral strategies rather than two-way communication with the people they claimed to represent—and yet, even as their voting bases disintegrated, still understood themselves to be doing what voters demanded. It's not enough to know that the political "market" broke down (which I'd say became pretty obvious in 2016, in the US); we need to know how progressive networks are reacting now, what they're doing differently—or not. So I'd like to extend the analysis in my book up to the present, mapping out shifts in party-expert networks since the financial crisis, especially via biographical interviews. This would be a US-centered project, though I'll go where it takes me. I think such an analysis could help to clarify the range of possibilities that lie on the political horizon.

I'm also especially interested in the representation of a particularly important class of things: the markets. I think of the markets and their spokespeople as something akin to a religious community; in that community, central banks have become the churches. In that line I will continue to work with Antoine Vauchez on the ECB, possibly looking also at the Fed.

Last but not least, I'd like to extend my work geographically, move more into political economy, and shift my attention away from the

representatives and toward the (mis)represented. I'm not sure where those impulses will take me at the moment, though I do have some ideas, which I will keep to myself for now.

As you look to the future, in what direction would you like to see political sociology heading?

I'd like to see political sociology cast its net ever-wider geographically, methodologically, and historically on the basis of a shared commitment to meaningful explanation of and the advancement of reason in politics. It's a terrible time in the political world out there, and I think that means that all the human sciences have to take a hard look at themselves in order to figure out how not to be part of the problem. I don't think political sociology is very good at casting a reflexive, critical gaze on itself; I'd like to see it take that task more seriously. And, as far as research practice, I'd like to see the subfield push against all tendencies to essentialize and de-historize, doubling-down on its relational and plural methodological impulses, never isolating the study of the political from the study of the economic and the cultural, treating persons just as historically as we do organizations or institutions, and jettisoning irresolvable concerns with the time-invariant primacy of this or that organization (parties, states, movements), analytical level, or causal mechanism. Above all, we need to be ambitious, and to support ambitious research, especially by younger-generation political sociologists. If everything is becoming political, then political sociology needs to become the sociology of everything!

Stephanie L. Mudge *is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Davis.*

Q&A with Elisabeth Anderson

CO-WINNER OF THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY ARTICLE AWARD

What inspired you to start working on "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Origins of the Regulatory Welfare State," published last year in ASR? How did the project evolve over time?

This article was a long time in the making. My interest in child labor reform grew originally out of my interest in expertise and politics in my first years of grad school. I had done work already on the impact of policy experts on consumer credit reform during the Progressive Era, and I was looking around for other examples of expert-driven policy change. I was interested in actors who fight for progressive policies without standing to benefit directly from these policies themselves--I wondered why they did it, and how they managed to be effective without having a lot of resources or a social movement to back them up. That's how I stumbled upon child labor, and as I learned more about the history of child labor regulation, it gradually dawned on me how important it was. It really represents the beginning of the modern regulatory welfare state, the first time the state intervened in the relationship between "free" industrial labor and the new industrial bourgeoisie, as I argue in the article.

The Prussian case was the first case I analyzed for my dissertation and out of it came the germ of the theory of policy entrepreneurship that I propose in the article. I eventually realized that the theory could be made much stronger and more convincing if I included a negative case--a case in which child labor regulation was seriously tried, but failed to become law. Such a case would allow me to determine whether the strategies of lead reformers really mattered for policy outcomes or whether divergent outcomes were actually attributable to other kinds of factors. Belgium was the best candidate for a negative case, but I needed to hire a French-speaking research assistant and a translator in order to study it properly. So it wasn't until after I began my job at NYU Abu Dhabi that I had the resources to include it, as well as the French case,

in my analysis. As it turned out, these two additional cases supported my hypothesis even more strongly than I expected them to. By comparing the two positive cases (Prussia and France) with the negative case of Belgium, I was able to refine my argument that individual policy entrepreneurs mattered by pinpointing the alliance-building and problem-solving strategies through which they achieved influence, as well as the conditions (field architecture and field position) under which they were more likely to deploy effective strategies.

How have the findings you outline in this article influenced your overall research agenda? What do you see as the core themes motivating your research going forward?

I think I have always been interested in the relationship between the individual reformer and social policy change. All of my work somehow seems to converge on this theme, even when it's not always been my primary intention starting out. I am just fascinated by these people--by what motivates them to fight for social change on behalf of others less fortunate than themselves, and by the question of whether and how a well-intentioned individual can make a positive difference in the world.

In the course of conducting research for my book manuscript, which expands on the article and includes four additional case studies, I started getting interested in the late 19th-century bureaucrats who built factory inspection departments in many U.S. states. These were agencies whose primary responsibility was enforcing child and female labor laws. The early factory inspectors had very little idea of what they were doing or how to do it, and they really had to just muddle through and figure out how to approach this huge task they were charged with. If you read their annual reports, you can actually see their bureaucratic habitus emerge and mature over the course of just a few years. This was a process of political learning at the individual level, just as much as it was a process of macro-level administrative capacity-building. These departments were also a mechanism through which the state was literally inserting itself bodily, in the physical form of the inspector, between vulnerable workers and exploitative employers, so they are very interesting from that point of view as well. I am thinking about exploring these ideas further once my current book project is complete.

As you look to the future, in what direction would you like to see political sociology heading?

I think we should continue to develop process-based explanations for political outcomes, explanations that take seriously the impact of individual actors, the culturally-embedded ideas that motivate them and shape their strategies, and their complex social relations as they unfold over time. I think we need to think more about how to integrate more traditional, macro-level variable-based explanations with these kinds of micro-level, qualitative and interpretive accounts.

Elisabeth Anderson *is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at NYU Abu Dhabi.*

Q&A with Yan Long

CO-WINNER OF THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY ARTICLE AWARD

How did you start working on the research project that led to the article "The Contradictory Impact of Transnational AIDS Institutions on State Repression in China, 1989-2013," published last year in AJS?

My fieldwork for this article began in 2007. As I followed the evolution of Chinese AIDS activism, it became clear that I was observing demobilization and social movement decline. Repression was a major factor in this process. But to truly understand the nonviolent, covert, indirect and softer strategies of repression and their mechanisms was difficult. Not only have political sociologists overwhelmingly focused on state violence and coercion

especially in the authoritarian context, the years of tracking and recording the death of a movement I loved was mentally draining. I was filled with frustration and anger watching how the movement was quietly dissolved from both inside and outside. Writing this article thus served as an emotional outlet for me.

How have the findings you outline in this article influenced your overall research agenda? What do you see as the core questions motivating your research going forward?

I continue to examine the triangular dynamics of transnational organizations, the state, and social movements in my forthcoming book, *Side Effects: The Transnational Making and Unmaking of AIDS Politics*. The book demonstrates how foreign interventions drove the building of a participatory, democracy-based infectious disease control system in China. AIDS mobilization was a sharp sword cast by transnational forces. But it played into the hands of Chinese health bureaucrats who utilized the AIDS movement to regain and expand their control. My findings challenge the prevalent but false dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism by showing how the installment of particular sets of democratic practices might contribute to the consolidation and expansion of the authoritarian political apparatus.

The interplay between globalization and authoritarianism is a core question on my research agenda. My theoretical commitment is to bridge the gap between organizational studies and institutional theory, on the one hand, and comparative politics and transnational relations studies, on the other. How to understand the rationalization of authoritarian and democratic power remains a major theme. In my new research project, I study the local experiences of global trends manifested in the different configuration of nonprofit sectors in six global cities in North America, Oceania, Western Europe, and East Asia. In particular, I am looking at the various ways in which the proliferation of professionalization, quantification, ranking/evaluation, and Internet technologies shapes the interactions between authoritarian and democratic practices that influence urban associational life. Hopefully my research can demonstrate the analytical payoff of utilizing transnational perspectives.

Where do you see the political sociology subfield heading? What do you think are some of the key ways that political sociology can contribute to current academic and public debates?

Political sociology is increasingly moving beyond methodological nationalism. The whole subfield is benefiting from the rise of transnational analyses in other disciplines such as political science, anthropology, law and history. Transnational analyses concerns not only the trans-border movement of people, ideas, technologies and institutions but also the making of nation-states through a variety of borders from immigration control, infectious disease quarantine, trade agreements, and projects of constructing national identities. More and more scholars are rejecting treating internal versus external factors in isolation. This requires us to look outside the western histories upon which political sociology was first built. It also challenges us to situate national and local political changes including the crisis in the U.S. in relation to dynamics across localities and over time in other parts of the world. Empires have risen and fallen throughout human history. Political sociologists are in a unique position to study the fate of American global hegemony and the future of the world order, both of which will inevitably shape both democratic and authoritarian rule.

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Q&A with Rachel Wetts

CO-WINNER OF THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY GRADUATE STUDENT ARTICLE AWARD

What inspired you to start working on "Models and Morals," and how did the project evolve over time?

"Models and Morals" is the first paper to come out of my dissertation research, in which I examine how American organizations have framed the issue of climate change, and how cultural and organizational processes affect which conceptions of climate change become dominant in mainstream media. One source of inspiration for this work is a practical desire to understand the social forces that have so far led to stalled political action to address climate change in the United States. Another source of inspiration for this project is a theoretical interest in how material and symbolic forms of power interact to perpetuate social systems or spur social change. Together, these interests have led me to investigate how the public debate around climate change is shaped by both the cultural meanings of climate messages and the power relationships of the organizations that promote them.

But, before I could ask these broader questions about how cultural and

material power shaped the climate debate, I needed to describe the content of organizations' climate messages in the first place. At first, I thought this was going to be something of a rote task, where I'd find what I already "knew": this is a highly polarized and contentious debate, where advocates on different sides of the political divide frame climate change in radically different ways. Instead, I found that—across a range of organizations with different goals, motivations, and strategies—a single, "post-political" frame of climate change dominates discourse. This framing is expert-oriented and technocratic, casting cooperation between economic and political elites as the appropriate way to address the climate problem, and neglecting concerns of values and identity widely believed to be important for social movement mobilization. That led this first paper to take on a life of its own, as this finding goes against many prior studies—and much common wisdom—about what American climate discourse looks like.

How have the findings you outline in this article influenced your overall research agenda? What do you see as the core themes motivating your research going forward?

The findings of this article have led me to ask many more questions. For example, the prevalence of post-political discourse suggests American organizations consistently—and curiously—portray a highly contentious issue that challenges the interests of powerful individuals and institutions as devoid of political struggle. So, how can we reconcile the cold and non-confrontational nature of American climate discourse with the robust evidence that public and elite opinion on climate change is highly polarized? And why would environmental advocacy organizations in particular promote this depoliticized framing, which prior research would suggest is unlikely to galvanize public concern?

In a project I'm developing now with Bob Brulle, we're planning to investigate how resource-dependence relationships between corporate foundations and advocacy organizations may have affected environmental discourse over the course of the climate change debate. We plan to examine the historical genesis of this value-neutral, technocratic, and non-confrontational discourse I find dominates American organizations' framings of climate change, examining to what extent economic ties between businesses and environmental organizations can explain the widespread use of this framing. This question is related to the core themes motivating my research, where I'm interested in investigating the relationship between material and cultural sources of

power—in this case, how public understandings and discourse around climate change may have been influenced by financial relationships between businesses and advocacy organizations over time.

As you look to the future, in what direction would you like to see political sociology heading?

Not to be a broken record, but I think one of the most promising directions for political sociology is in bridging scholarship that emphasizes material power differences, such as the ability of different groups to mobilize economic resources, with scholarship that emphasizes cultural, emotional, and symbolic explanations for political outcomes. At this point each side of the material-symbolic divide has rich theoretical resources and empirical tools for understanding political developments, but I think the most exciting work describes how these are related. How are cultural understandings shaped by power differences, and how do material resources vary in their effects across different cultural contexts? I think taking on these synthetic questions leads to more accurate and richer understandings of political processes, and can also help political sociology speak to long-standing questions of broad theoretical interest.

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Q&A with Yueran Zhang

CO-WINNER OF THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY GRADUATE STUDENT ARTICLE AWARD

How did you first develop an interest in the role of redistributive taxation in China?

I first got interested in studying taxation from a sociological perspective as an undergraduate student. My undergraduate advisor, Professor Bai Gao at Duke University, introduced me to works by Monica Prasad and Isaac Martin, particularly the book they co-edited, *The New Fiscal Sociology*. These works had a big influence during my intellectually formative years. They made me realize that taxation is one of the crucial arenas that directly links the internal dynamics of the state to the broader social context the state faces. Later, I was exposed to works by a younger generation of fiscal sociologists, such as Elizabeth Pearson and Diana Rodríguez-Franco. Reading these scholars helped me see that the sociological study of taxation is indeed becoming a very dynamic and exciting research enterprise, and I want to be part of that.

When it comes to the politics of taxation in China, many scholars in sociology and political science—such

as Xiaobo Lü, Thomas Bernstein, Changdong Zhang and Yingyao Wang—have examined taxation in terms of its implications for the authoritarian rule of the Chinese state. That is, the questions they have asked concern how taxation both provoked social contention that challenged the authoritarian state and provided subtle ways to strengthen the resilience of this state. This type of questions is very important, but I have felt that somehow it reduces the study of taxation to an appendage of the study of state authoritarianism. Therefore I wanted to study taxation in China in a way that would provide an alternative to the authoritarianism-centered framework and contribute not only to the sociology of the authoritarian state but the sociology of the state more broadly.

Studying redistributive and progressive taxation gives me leverage in this regard. Most states have to balance the delicate tensions between different classes and social groups. Most have enacted redistributive and progressive taxation in part to do exactly that. In this sense, the Chinese state faces a challenge that is also faced by most other states, democratic or authoritarian. My research details the very different ways in which two municipal states in China met the challenge of enacting redistributive property tax. Such differences could not be explained by state authoritarianism alone. Instead, explaining such differences has enabled me to connect my cases with broad, long-lasting debates in the sociology of the state.

How is this project tied to your past research agenda? How does it fit in to what you plan on doing moving forward?

This project was the first research project I did in grad school. My current dissertation research examines how three waves of mass movements in China—the Cultural Revolution rebel movement in 1966-1967, the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-1979, and the Tiananmen protests in 1989—and their repression by the party-state shaped China's trajectory of market-oriented economic reform. My project on redistributive taxation inspired my dissertation in two ways.

First, this project shows that China's redistributive property tax was very much a product of the "Chongqing Model," a short-lived mode of governance that combined charismatic leadership, top-down mass mobilization, heavy-handed repression against dissidents, populist rhetoric against economic elites, and an ideal of more egalitarian economic development. Replicating many key

elements of Maoism, this "Model" has enjoyed wide popular support in many sectors of Chinese society, and showed that Maoism holds broad political appeal not despite, but because of, market-oriented reforms. This discovery got me interested in Maoism and wondering how it shaped and conditioned China's economic reforms. My dissertation seeks to address this question.

Second, one argument I make in this paper is that the ways in which Chinese policymakers designed and framed fiscal policy critically depended on their perceptions of what would be (im)possible given the particular social contexts they faced. Examining how such perceptions are formed, and how they enable and constrain policymaking, will enrich our theorization of the state. My dissertation is an attempt to examine these processes, particularly in highly uncertain moments of dramatic political turmoil.

What do you want to see in the future of the political sociology sub-field?
I would really like to see more systematic, empirically grounded comparative studies that deconstruct the dichotomy between what we'd call "authoritarian" polities and what we'd call "democratic" polities. A conceptual opposition between authoritarianism/totalitarianism and liberal democracy seems to have loomed large over political sociology, with the implication that each side of the dichotomy requires a separate, specialized theoretical apparatus. Practically, most research on "authoritarian" polities invokes an implicit comparison with "democratic" polities, only to reify the difference between the two. This is especially true with regard to the political sociology of China.
Are authoritarianism/totalitarianism and liberal democracy so different that they are not meaningfully comparable? Can't the two be studied, at least in some aspects, through a unified theoretical framework? After all, a Marxist tradition of political thought has long argued that liberal democracy is nothing more than class dictatorship. We might not agree with the Marxist position, but I feel a more critical stance regarding this conceptual distinction is in order.

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SYMPOSIUM:
Politics and the Media

Introduction: Why Media Matters for Political Sociology

BY NATHAN KATZ

Media and communication are central to political action. Media not only allows for coordination and activism, but also for an informed public, and control over media itself is perhaps one of the greatest sources of political power. Sociological thought has long wrestled with the role of media and its public involvement. Both de Tocqueville and Martineau highlighted the importance of both media content and control. In terms of volume, Marx produced far more journalistic works than academic ones, and Ida B. Wells is known far more for her journalism than for her sociological contributions. Perhaps Weber put it best claiming that media shaped both the subjective experiences of individuals and the objective nature of culture by helping people understand how their personal experiences fit within a broader social reality.

In more recent years Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* has become a staple for scholars of politics, media, and critical theory. These intellectual traditions with a strong focus on the public sphere, content control, and questions of how format influences knowledge have found much more attention in media sociology programs, often tied to communication and journalism schools, than in sociology. But the role of media in politics is vital and ever changing. As both technology and the state have evolved, so have the purposes, forms, and roles of media. Social media, artificial intelligence, and hyper-targeting have all been sources of recent contention within politics, not only in terms of questions of censorship, but also the spread of accurate information. These changes, among others, result in the reformation of the public sphere at local, national, and global levels. For this symposium we asked multiple scholars: "What recent changes in the media landscape do you consider to be the most influential for political life and engagement?" We are delighted to have three very different and compelling answers.

Ya-Wen Lei analyzes the role of the state in Chinese media as the government struggles with external forces. Steve Barnard focuses on the role of the internet and social media, and how it influences structural changes in political knowledge. Sylvio Waisbord reviews many of the changes made challenging what it truly means to discuss "the media" at all. If there is one overarching theme to point out in each submission, it is the challenge of fragmentation of power: how does media power fragment, what are the implications, and how do people attempt to stop it? These, and many other questions, show that the world of media politics is ripe with opportunities for sociologists to make empirical and theoretical contributions to the field.

China's Transnational Impact

BY YA-WEN LEI

I would argue that the Chinese Party-state's extraterritorial influence in and beyond the media landscape has important consequences for political life and engagement outside of China. This important trend can be clearly seen in the recent NBA-China controversy and the influence of the Chinese state's censorship on film and TV show production, as well as on academic publications.

In the last empirical chapter of my first book, *The Contentious Public Sphere* (Princeton University Press 2018), I detailed how the Chinese state struck back to contain the once-prospering public sphere. Techniques that the Chinese state employs include consolidating the Chinese leviathan, upgrading techniques of surveillance and censorship, attacking the "black group," turning the "gray group" into red, and asserting China's cyber-sovereignty. The black-gray-red classification was proposed by propaganda officials in China. The red group refers to patriotic citizens supportive of the Chinese state; the black group refers to those critical of the Chinese state; and the gray group refers to the silent majority. This kind of classification scheme tends to equate people critical of the Chinese Party-state with traitors or enemies of the Chinese nation.

In the domestic setting, the Chinese state relies on its monopoly of physical and symbolic violence to contain and control the national public sphere. The state's governance techniques have led to the punishment, exclusion, and silencing of people who publicly criticize state agencies—from human rights lawyers to journalists, activists, and people of all kinds who want their rights to be restored. These Chinese governance techniques have also created fear, self-censorship, and the false appearance that there is only

one voice—a "red" voice—among Chinese people. Moreover, censorship at home has transnational impacts. Censoring controversial scientific practices in China not only creates an information black hole within China, but also affects the availability of information for people around the world more generally [1].

What has been changing rapidly in recent years is the Chinese state's exercising governing techniques outside of China. On one hand, the Chinese state has applied the strategy of attacking the "black group" to people who are non-PRC citizens outside of PRC territory; for example, non-PRC citizens who express their views on Twitter—which is blocked by China's Great Firewall. The implementation of such a strategy is evidenced by the threats and punishments imposed by the Chinese state on foreign business actors, such as the NBA and Cambridge University Press, due to their forms of speech and publications [2]. Most organizations in this position remain silent and even act according to the Chinese state's requests because of their economic interests. On the other hand, however, the Chinese state has also attempted to turn the "gray group" into red. Although Twitter is blocked in China, Chinese propaganda officials produce and disseminate their information and viewpoints on Twitter, even though Chinese citizens cannot. As Jaw-Nian Huang demonstrates in his new book *The Political Economy of Press Freedom* (Routledge 2019), the Chinese state has influenced media outside of China to shape public discourse in its favor.

Although the Chinese state does not enjoy a monopoly of violence outside of China's territory, it is able to leverage the dependence of foreign individuals and entities on China and Chinese actors. The state threatens to limit Chinese outbound capital and tourists, controlling one of the world's largest domestic markets. Foreign individuals and entities can easily be held hostage by the Chinese state due to their dependent relationship. For instance, in 2012, when a civil rights activist escaped from China after years of imprisonment and detention, the dean of Fordham Law School attempted to rescind the School's decision to host the activist as a visiting fellow because the dean of Fordham's business school was worried that the activist's presence would cause a decline in Chinese applicants [3]. A recent study by Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, based on a survey of Chinese scholars in North America, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong, finds that 68% of respondents consider self-censorship to be a concern in the field of Chinese studies [4].

The Chinese Party-state has

extraterritorial influence on media—including but not limited to media outlets, social media, production companies, and academic publishers—and a variety of other actors and institutions outside of China. This influence has enormous effects on how people exercise their freedom of speech, expression, and association, as well as how they engage in political, civic, and intellectual life.

The rising extraterritorial influence of the Chinese Party-state points to the need for sociological research in this area. There has been little research on how the Chinese state influences the understanding and exercise of freedom of speech, expression, and association in liberal democracies. We also know little about the relationship between nationalism and the Chinese state's extraterritorial influence. Finally, we need more research to understand how people who do not depend on China perceive and respond to China's extraterritorial influence on their political and civil life.

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Power and Politics in the Age of Hybrid Media

BY STEVE BARNARD

I doubt anyone who has been paying attention would disagree with the assertion that our media and their role in politics have changed significantly over the past decade. Of course, the aphorism "the only constant is change" might be read as an apt description of practically any social institution from a bird's eye view. So, what makes this past decade any different from previous ones?

This may be answerable by accounting for how media have changed in recent years. One obvious change is the growing influence of digital media. Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman (2014) have referred to the rise of the internet, mobile phones, and social networks as a "triple revolution" due to their combined significance in social and political life.

Today, a solid 90% of American adults use the internet (Anderson et al. 2019). While this inevitably leaves out a notable portion of the population [1], this level of connectivity allows information to flow rapidly.

The flow of information is intensified further by the use of mobile devices, the primary way many access the internet. Ninety-six percent of Americans own mobile phones and 81 percent own smartphones ("Demographics of Mobile..." 2019), contributing to a culture of near-constant communication.

Social media are inarguably among the most popular applications for internet and mobile phone users. These platforms play an increasingly significant role in the public sphere—namely as spaces where citizens can consume, share, and discuss news. While establishment media like television (49%), news websites (33%) and radio (26%) remain as driving forces behind Americans' news consumption habits, the use of social media for news (20%) is steadily increasing (Shearer 2018).

Rather than think of these media as distinct entities, or as old and new, it is better to treat them as part of a "hybrid media system" (Chadwick 2017). In such a system, actors—and indeed, channels—compete for the public's attention, and for the symbolic sources that define and shape the social world.

The rise of hybrid media represents a structural shift, providing new opportunities for less powerful actors to build and wield influence while at the same time allowing those in traditionally dominant positions additional opportunities to reassert their power. In the case of social media platforms, it has also upended the processes of gatekeeping and agenda-setting so that traditional publishers now have less of a monopoly on determining what information reaches mass audiences, and therefore, what issues drive public discussion and debate.

Unsurprisingly, this unsettling of the traditional informational order has had mixed implications for the public sphere. As I have found in my own research (Barnard 2018), Twitter frequently plays host to contestations of (media) power. Although Twitter is hardly representative of the American public, its status as an open forum densely populated with journalists, politicians, and political activists positions it as an important site of the networked public sphere.

President Donald Trump is perhaps the greatest Twitter influencer. Even though he lags behind a dozen or so celebrities in terms of following, Trump's Twitter strategy has proven

extraordinarily effective at driving attention. While the aphorism "all press is good press" remains debatable, Trump has successfully used the platform to circumvent news media to spread his messages, and at the same time compel media professionals to amplify his rhetoric further through their own channels (Barnard 2018).

This strategy is comparable to what others have described as "media manipulation" (Marwick and Lewis 2017), which often combines spectacle with offensive and emotionally charged rhetoric to attract attention from media professionals and publics across the political spectrum.
When considered alongside the host of other strategies political actors frequently use to hack their way into audiences' news feeds, including through clandestinely-run social media pages, targeted advertising, and posts optimized for virality and algorithmic visibility, it is clear that media carry greater power today than perhaps ever before. Perhaps it is time we sociologists start paying it greater mind.

Notes

[1] Non-internet users tend to be older, less educated, lower-income, to live in rural areas, and to identify with minority groups.

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Shapeshifting Media

BY SILVIO WAISBORD

The digital revolution has transformed virtually everything we knew about the nexus between media and political life. From changes in personal media habits to the structure of media markets, the scale of the transformations has been unprecedented. “The media” of today are fundamentally different from the media of the past. In contrast to hierarchical, one-way analog media, digital media are interactive and networked. Digital media blur distinctions between interpersonal and mass communication, as well as professional and amateur content. Digitalization ushered in media abundance and media chaos.

Not surprisingly, digital media have changed politics in many ways. They offer tools for political elites to bypass the news media, opportunities for organized publics to discuss and coordinate collective action, easy-to-access, low-cost tools for rogue actors to poison the well of public information, and resources for citizens to express and monitor the flow of daily events.

Thankfully, the wild-eyed techno-utopianism about digital media of a decade ago has lost much luster. In the aftermath of revelations about massive invasion of privacy by governments and telecommunication companies and shady, anti-democratic operations by dominant Internet corporations, it is patent that techno-utopianism was a misguided fantasy rather than sure-footed sociology. Instead, today we have more sober, evenhanded and critical views about the impact of digital media/technology on society and politics (Broussard 2018). From grand, evidence-thin visions about digital media as silver bullets for resolving complex problems (from authoritarianism to loneliness), there are now serious, growing doubts about the compatibility of digital media with human rights and democratic values (Tumber and Waisbord 2017).

A more benign, ecumenical interpretation is that digital media have disrupted politics in good and

bad ways. They ushered in new forms of public expression in support of solidarity and social justice, and amplified hate and irrationality. They made possible the proliferation of various forms of expression, and are the engines of data/surveillance capitalism (Noble 2018; Zuboff 2019). As digital politics continues to rapidly change, scholars are busy surveying the consequences and the opportunities, the good and the bad, the triumphs and the wreckage.

Of all changes brought about by the digital revolution, I think the shapeshifting nature of "the media" is a major turning point that deserves attention for understanding the complexity of the relationship between media and politics.

In the past, "the media" were understood as channels/technologies and industries for information, communication, expression, and symbolic action. Mass media were associated with print and broadcasting technologies and companies, consumed in specific times for leisure or information. Because they had been relatively stable, scholars talked about relatively constant properties of the media.

What happens when the media keep evolving and expanding? It is harder to define "the media" in a few concise sentences or to identify common features.

Anything that "mediates" is a poor option. Unlike the media of the analog era, digital media are more than vehicles for symbolic expression, political propaganda, and commercialism. The most powerful digital media companies are in the business of data production, mining, slicing and packaging. If content was said to be king in the past, data is now the master of the universe. From social media to self-tracking media, digital platforms are data dynamos. Professional and user-generated content is mainly bait for reeling in public attention. As audiences leave digital crumbs, companies turn behaviors into data for maximizing the reach and the impact of advertisers, governments and other actors. Also, social media, search engines, and streaming companies are not content producers in the same way news, television and film companies were. Haptic media are integral part of media ecologies, too. Facial recognition software and other forms of surveillance technologies are media.

Under these conditions, it is misguided to talk about "the media" as if they were a monolithic institution. It is a convenient shorthand, but it doesn't mean much. Even talking about certain media as a single unit downplays important differences; for example, social media refers to platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram that feature important differences in

terms of practices, content, format and so on.

The shapeshifting condition of contemporary media has notably expanded the analytical scope of media sociology (Waisbord 2014). The "mediated construction of reality" (Couldry and Hepp 2018) means that essential aspects of contemporary societies cannot be adequately understood without foregrounding the multifaceted roles of media structures and dynamics.

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IN THE NEWS

The "Chilean Spring" of 2019



BY NICOLÁS M. SOMMA, MATÍAS BARGSTED, RODOLFO DISI AND RODRIGO MEDEL

Since mid-October to late November 2019, a massive wave of peaceful demonstrations and violent riots and lootings has spread across Chile. Protesters are voicing a wide array of socioeconomic demands. Their ranks include people from all walks of life, with a marked presence of youths and students. Given the scale of protests and their disruptive consequences - including the destruction of historical buildings and Santiago's subway system - Center-Right president Sebastián Piñera has declared a state of emergency and night curfews, unleashing the repressive potential of security forces. This has resulted in more than twenty deaths and thousands of wounded civilians and security agents. Although the government has also promised a "social agenda" to face popular demands, this combination of repression and concessions has so far failed to defuse the gravest socio-political crisis in decades in one of the most stable Latin American countries. The government and the opposition's agreement to replace the current Pinochet-era (1973-1990) Constitution through a participatory mechanism is the latest political attempt to find a solution.

The dominant view among the army of social scientists and pundits trying to explain this surprising explosion points to the accumulation of grievances resulting from the socio-economic model inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship – a model only mildly reformed and in some ways deepened by further democratic governments. This model is characterized by the major role of private actors in the provision of basic infrastructure and social services, low pensions, expensive (if private) and deficient (if public) health care, weakened working class actors, and a subsidiary state. Despite undeniable decreases in poverty and improvements in living standards during the past three decades, economic inequality remains high and a large proportion of Chileans cannot make ends meet. These conditions stirred up popular grievances over time until - as in the boiling-water metaphor - they exploded with a 3.75 percent fare hike in the Santiago subway.

Without denying the validity of this interpretation, we believe that more ingredients are needed to make sense of the Chilean crisis. We highlight three: a dislocation between politics and citizens; cultural change; and leaderless mobilizations.

First, the Chilean political system has become increasingly detached from society (Bargsted and Maldonado 2018, Somma and Medel 2017). Rates of identification with political parties have plummeted from close to 80% in the mid-1990s to less than 20% today, and electoral turnout has dropped below 50%. Linkages between social movements and partisan organizations have progressively broken down as well (Disi 2018). A new leftist force – the *Frente Amplio* – obtained a surprising 20% of the vote in the 2017 elections but could not channel institutionally much societal discontent. About one-third of those who protest in Chile do not vote - one of the highest percentages among protesters in contemporary democracies. According to a survey conducted a week after the conflict exploded, 57% of 18 to 34-year-olds have protested since its inception - way over the 33% of that population segment that voted in the last presidential elections, according to official electoral data. These non-voting protesters with weak ties to political parties are central actors in this conflict.

Second, rapid cultural change has worsened the effects of unequal capitalist development on popular discontent. In recent decades, Chilean capitalism has boosted successful export companies and attracted international investors, turning Chile into an up-and-coming country in international forums and economic rankings. However, the development of more egalitarian norms regarding gender, sexual orientation, ethnic status and age differences, has increased the assertiveness and self-worthiness of structurally subordinate groups in Chilean society. Also, the combination of more aggressive and sophisticated judicial prosecutors, watchdog journalists, and new transparency laws, have revealed innumerable cases of corruption and abuses by the economic, political, military and religious elites. This has buried their credibility and reputation among the general population – deepening the wedge between elites and the masses. As traditional legitimations of authority positions recede, socioeconomic inequalities have become more unbearable and cannot be justified in terms of differences in merit or moral worth.

Finally, a surprising element of the current Chilean crisis is the tangential role played so far by social movement organizations in leading the protests – even in the peaceful ones. Particularly in the first two weeks of the crisis,

very few organizations and leaders were visible. Afterwards, a heterogeneous “Social Unity Front” emerged, which has promoted the organization of thousands of *cabildos* (town hall meetings) to discuss the situation and articulate demands, including calls for a Constituent Assembly. This Front, however, has not led the mobilizations, and does not negotiate with the government the way students or unions did in past movements. This is noteworthy given the centrality of movement organizations in the major Chilean protest waves during the last fifteen years (Somma and Medel 2019). In a country with high levels of internet use, movement leaders seem to be partially replaced by the rapidly evolving, innumerable conversations circulating through social media across the country.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Is it the Left or the Right that We Should be Focused On or Both? Review of Stephanie Mudge's *Leftism Reinvented*

BY THOMAS JANOSKI,
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Two major books and a third have come out in the area of comparative political sociology in the last two years. Stephanie Mudge's *Leftism Reinvented: Western Political Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism* (2018, Harvard University Press) and Daniel Ziblatt's *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy* (2017, Cambridge University Press) followed by Sten Levity and Daniel Ziblatt's *How Democracies Die* (2018, Crown Publishing of Penguin).[1] Mudge follows social democratic, labor and democratic (US) parties in three periods: socialism (1900 to 1929 but centered on 1920), Keynesian revolution (1930 to 1974 but centered on 1960), and 'left' neoliberalism (1975 to 2005 centered around 1995).

She examines these three periods, focusing on economic policy shifts in four countries: the US, the UK, Germany, and Sweden. She focuses on party experts and how they have become economized in the middle period, and then share power with professional campaign experts in the third period. Her main conclusion is that we should pay attention to party experts because they articulate policy downward upon the rest of the party and the public in general. But the sub-text to the book is that left parties are the key to greater democracy and reducing endemic inequality in a capitalist economy. And a sub-sub-text is that Bill and Hillary Clinton sold out the left to neoliberalism.

Daniel Ziblatt examines the role of conservative parties in two of the same countries: the UK and Germany. Conservative parties have a major problem in that they represent rich people who are few, and in a mass party system how in the world are they going to keep their massive amounts of money when the non-rich and poor seemingly have little or no reason to vote for their candidates? Using the method of difference, he shows that conservative parties in the UK were able to extend their reach into the middle and working classes by building institutions that interested these two classes, and then pushed their message on non-income related issues like the empire and the Irish question. One of the main vehicles for doing this was

the Primrose Society that operated a combination of fairs and political indoctrination in the Victorian period. German conservative parties mainly represented by the *Deutschenationale Volkspartie* (DNVP) stayed focused on elites and carried a very small constituency. Ziblatt's major point is that moderate conservative parties are entirely necessary to protect democracy from the far right like the Nazi Party in Germany. Levity and Ziblatt follow this with *How Democracies Die*, which is a more popular book implementing their principles and also applying them to Donald Trump. One criticism of Ziblatt's thesis would be why he did not focus on the Center Party during Weimar which was a larger conservative (or maybe center) party during the Weimar Republic.

Perhaps a compromise or judicious position would be that anyone interested in democracy should pay attention to both left and conservative parties, though political sociologists often would rather study the left (myself included).

Mudge's book is impressive in its scope with regards to years of history (about 1890 to 2005) and the number of countries she considers in narrative detail. The natural inclination for most sociologists would be to go straight to the major politicians and see what influenced them. Instead she focuses on the party theoreticians and major economists, which are the Ministers of Finance (Sweden and Germany), the Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK), or Secretary of Treasury (US). She examines left party political platforms and this involves considerable translational efforts. She constructs a neoliberalism index for the center left and the center right, but only maps out the US figures for this. Otherwise, the scores are aggregated for bundles of countries in regime types. Her conclusions that party theoreticians abstained from intervention (circa 1920), party Keynesian economists fully embraced government intervention (circa 1960 but beginning in the 1930s), and transnational finance-oriented economists deregulated (circa 1995) is conclusively shown for the United Kingdom and Sweden.

For the US and Germany her thesis can be generally accepted as a tendency, but it is less persuasive in terms of a full explanation. For the US, the first period is the problem. She decides not to cover it because there was no left party. However, this ignores the influence of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, the progressive movement, the governmental reining in of the robber barons with anti-trust, and the impact of Woodrow Wilson's two Secretaries of the Treasury, one who averted a financial run at the beginning of World War II

withdrawing all their money from the US economy to fight a war by closing the NY Stock Exchange, and the other by establishing the Federal Reserve – both notable economic interventions. That they are not labor or social democratic parties is correct, but that statement applies equally well to the whole history of the Democratic Party. Also, one might want to tip their hat to Eugene Debs running for president. Germany might be less of a problem, but one has to note that having been Nazified in 1933, Germany no longer fits her thesis since Hitler banned and then persecuted left parties.

The neoliberal period (centering on 1995) also has a problem with Germany. It would have been helpful if Mudge had used the Millsian method of difference or even better concomitant variation rather than the method of agreement. The method of agreement largely assumes that all the countries are the same in neoliberalism. As only the US positive scores are reported, it is hard to know what the other three countries are on the scale. I would expect all left parties to become more neoliberal (as per her combined regime scores show), but I would contend that Germany is the least neoliberal country of the four. In reporting both left economic experts and political campaign experts, the other countries are well covered, but when it comes to Germany it is hard to find neoliberal economists on the left, and the campaign experts only come to two and one of them is McKinsey in the US. The problem goes further with Germany since Helmut Kohl, though an apparent neoliberal, had tough sledding getting neoliberal policies passed through the Bundestag. Further, other Chancellors did not revoke worker power in revoking codetermination on corporate boards, and elected works councils in firms along with larger scale trade unions. Another issue is the use of active labor market policies in periods 2 and 3. Clearly, Keynesian policies operated directly to create job training, job placement and job creation policies. While they were cut in the US, they continued to function in Sweden and Germany, though at a smaller level. Because of this, she misses the role of economists to invalidate claims for job creation based on substitution effects, which is an important part of neoliberal ideology. While all these countries may have moved towards neoliberalism in their left parties, some countries moved much further than others did. Here it would be helpful to see the scores for all four countries to see exactly where they moved. I suspect it moved much less than the others despite the Hartz IV reforms, which pale in comparison to the deep cuts in the welfare state in the US.

One of Mudge's theoretical claims is a refraction approach to political

parties. This takes off from articulation theory with its party downward approach, with five points:
(1) Parties exist on a relational terrain;
(2) Parties have complex goals of winning office, representing constituents and perhaps their own consciences, and claiming the truth;
(3) Parties are anchored to state, administrative, civic, economic and cultural terrains;
(4) Parties are especially focused on cultural infrastructure including education, socialization, knowledge production, and producing experts on the economy and other policies; and
(5) Party experts engage in intermediation often between Bourdieusian fields.

The refraction approach incorporates articulation theory from the party to their publics, but still maintains the reverse flow from constituents or the public in terms of influencing party experts and politicians--sometimes called reflection theory. The metaphor of lenses or prisms makes one recall their physics courses, but prisms or mirrors reflect light (interests), and refracted devises introduce a large measure of distortion or redirection into the process (expert theory).

On the Bourdieusian field note, one might note that 'political economy' itself is an intermediation between fields that has been done for centuries. And in Mudge's book, the cultural explanations (point 4) are much smaller than the focus on political economy. To test the refraction theory, one would have to measure both the top-down and the bottom-up effects. One can see arguments for both. But for all of the "let there be light" approach of reflection and refraction, the refraction approach does seem to be much more reasonable and balanced than the reflection (or interest conveyor belt) theory and the articulation (or top down imposition of policy by party leader) theory. The three-part complex goals view of parties (win, represent, and truth telling) is useful in recognizing that parties are often hard to figure out, especially if one assumes that they only have one goal (a point made by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie about labor unions in *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (1965, ILR Press)). All in all, refraction theory is the most comprehensive and potentially accurate approach to political parties that I have seen.

[1] One other book by Binyamin Appelbaum, *The Economists' House: False Prophets, Free Markets, and the Fracture of Society* (Little Brown, 2019), explores the role of the rise of economists even in the third period of Mudge's work. But this is more in the vein of economic journalism.

Review of Mudge's *Leftism Reinvented*

BY GABRIEL CHOUHY,
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Stephanie Mudge (2018) has written a superb and much-welcome book that certainly makes a groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of the great transformations in western capitalist democracies during the 20th century. Much has been already said about this impressive attempt at explaining the two historical reinventions of leftism--from socialism to Keynesianism, and from Keynesianism to neoliberalism--through a historical-comparative analysis of the changing role of different types of party experts in four major Left parties of the West: the German Social Democratic Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the British Labor Party, and the Democratic Party in the US. A standard review would certainly fall back on providing a balanced, dispassionate assessment of how greatly or poorly this book fares in advancing existing knowledge in political sociology. Hence my choice here is exactly the opposite: to highlight Mudge's contribution not to the sociology of leftist politics but to the politics of leftist sociologists.

Seven decades ago, Friedrich Hayek (1949) published an incendiary essay titled "The Intellectuals and Socialism," where he defined modern intellectuals as mere "second-hand dealers of ideas." Intellectuals for Hayek were not so much renowned experts in specialized disciplinary fields as learned and politically-committed people who turned their cultural authority into "organs" for the interpretation and translation of dominant ideas and knowledge to the great masses. Almost a Gramscian, but contradicting Gramsci's diagnosis, Hayek complained that, for decades, only the cultured of socialist persuasion had assumed, militantly, an active role as organic intellectuals. Only the socialist intellectuals, Hayek argued, "have offered anything like an explicit program of social development, a picture of the future society at which they were aiming, and a set of general principles to guide decisions on particular issues" (428). Hayek closed his essay with a harangue, a call on the liberals to fight for cultural hegemony. Urgent for Hayek was the reconstruction of "a liberal Utopia": a program of "truly liberal radicalism" which "appeals to the imagination" and "does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible" (432). And critical to this project were "intellectual leaders who are willing to work for an ideal, however small may be the prospects of its early realization" (432).

A man of his word, Hayek devoted his life to building a transnational movement of (neo)liberal intellectuals. The neoliberals started hundreds of think tanks all around the world, opened research institutes and business schools, founded magazines and newspapers, colonized international organizations, and courted politicians and bureaucrats from across ideological camps. The movement not only contributed to the transformation of economics into an internationalized, finance-oriented profession; it also fomented a new common sense about the moral virtue of markets as an axial principle for social regulation.

Now, thanks to *Leftism Reinvented*, we know mass parties of the Left were, too, key drivers of this great transformation. How this happened is eloquently revealed by Mudge's "inside-out" approach to political parties as contested fields wherein factions of truth-claiming party experts vie for the formulation of economic interpretations and doctrines, thus shaping parties' capacity to intermediate. Mudge's focus on party experts' biographies gives proper name, voice, and agency to the key figures who, speaking for both party officials and those parties claim to represent, led the shift from socialism to Keynesianism in the 1950s-1960s, and then to neoliberalism in the 1980s-1990s. Of paramount importance was the dynamic between these experts and the economics profession, which Mudge summarizes through an insightful typology. In the beginning was the socialist theoretician, a non-credentialed pamphleteer and agitator recruited and socialized within the socialist parties' network infrastructure of cultural production and mass education, who spoke economics in a Marxist vein. The road from marginality to political power required that the socialist theoretician be replaced by the economist theoretician. At once an academically trained and party-affiliated economist, this new type of expert was the bearer of a much-needed Keynesian ethics, translating popular demands into sound economic analysis and management in the context of Polanyian-like double-movements for decommodification and social protection. Mudge notes that the ascent of Keynesian-oriented Left parties and the concomitant expansion of the administrative state certainly contributed to the growth and consolidation of the economics profession. But it also opened the door for its politicization. The neoliberal challenge intensified interpretative struggles over the causes of and solutions to economic turmoil, undermining the Keynesian political consensus, which in turn enabled the reorientation of the economic profession towards corporate

networks and international finance. The resulting type of economic expert who came to dominate parties' programmatic language, the transnational, finance-oriented economist, no longer spoke for labor or any other popular constituency whatsoever, except for abstract and--allegedly--apolitical markets. Succumbing to the new market common sense and deprived of any capacity to intermediate, Left Parties turned to policy wonks and campaign strategists, who could only speak for what works and what wins, not for the working people.

The political lesson for leftist sociologists is clear. Mudge's account of the current erosion of Left parties' capacity to speak for the voiceless in highly unequal capitalist democracies comes with an indictment of the detachment of the everyday practices of social science professionals from the business of party organization and mobilization. This distant, if not commodified, relationship that prevails today may be a source of anxiety, indignation, or alienation among progressive scholars. But it has had even earthlier detrimental impact on the lives of those "possessing nothing but their own labor-power" (Marx and Engels 2007:188). Should this indictment be read as just another cry out for a more reflexive sociology? Or is instead an invitation to engage, following Riley (2018:109), in the practical task of "overcoming the political isolation of the intelligentsia in advanced capitalism"? Rather than professional commitment to reflexive sociology, what is necessary is building new forms of mediation between intellectuals and the masses that allow for mutual transformation, "from practice to theory and from theory to practice" (p. 121). This is the same problem Hayek and their Mont Pellerin Society Fellows--a sort of Neoliberal International (Jones 2014)--once foresaw and worked relentlessly to overcome. It is concerned not so much with the scientific as with political methods for integrating knowledge and political engagement. Acknowledgement of the crucial role played by progressive experts in the neoliberalization of the Left is not enough. Breaking "the very separation of political life from social science that is characteristic of contemporary society" (Riley 2018:126) requires something more than great books like *Leftism Reinvented*. To start, it necessitates direct political engagement in the critique and transformation of the established cannon of professionalism and forms of knowledge production within the capitalist university. The task, in the end, is that of the reorganization of the progressive intelligentsia and its relinking with bottom-up processes of mass mobilization and party formation. Such has been, and will be, the historical project of social democracy.

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Review of Mudge's *Leftism Reinvented*

BY JEFF STILLEY,
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In 1934, Karl Polanyi wrote, “Either capitalism or democracy must go. Fascism is the solution of the deadlock which leaves capitalism untouched. The other solution is socialism. Capitalism goes, democracy remains.” Polanyi’s socialism is a topic of debate among scholars, but he clearly hoped social democratic reforms would transcend the double movement to permanently subordinate markets to democracy. This hope never panned out. Explaining why socialist parties moved first to Keynesianism, then to neoliberalism, is the subject of a remarkable new book from sociologist Stephanie Mudge.

As political sociologists probe the role political parties and labor movements play in mediating and co-constituting the state and polities, Mudge’s *Leftism Reinvented* will stand out as a guiding methodological text. The basic argument is that political party experts, particularly in center-left parties, “refract” and interpret political developments. The refraction approach “involves the study of historical change from the inside out, centered on the formation, infrastructural conditions, and orientations of party experts” (27). Experts develop political language that shapes how constituents relate to the state. Shifts in party rhetoric during Polanyian moments, achieved through intraparty struggle, is a driving force behind the formation of new institutional arrangements of political economy.

Mudge defines “left” parties as mass-based center-left parties that claim

to pursue equality for the underrepresented in society. The UK Labour, German SDS, Swedish SAP, and US Democratic Party are compared from the late 1800s to the 1990s. The inclusion of the Democratic Party is artfully handled in its treatment as an organization that became "left" when it converged with its European counterparts through Keynesianism. This is explained through the Polanyian moments of the 1930s and 1970s, intraparty struggles for dominance, and transnational networks of politicians and economists. Party experts' trajectories are contextualized within shifting relationships between social fields: economic, political, cultural, and bureaucratic.

The book convincingly argues that prior to the 1930s, European party theoreticians were college educated socialists influencing party policies and language through socialist party institutional channels, like newspapers. The rise of Keynesian economist theoreticians from 1930-1960 is explained through party theorists' unwillingness to let go of fiscal orthodoxy in the interest of maintaining left party legitimacy when states could no longer fund social insurance and welfare programs on a balanced budget. Economists were liberal academics who served parties by adjusting economic analyses to political imperatives. Transnational processes within the economic profession spread this trend.

Mudge traces the emergence of transnational finance economists and political strategists in the 1990s to intraparty struggles over the interpretation of stagflation in the 70s and what New Left movements meant for party demographics, showing that global financialization trends took off after these neoliberals came to dominate center-left parties, depressing voter turnout. Anxiety over "stagflation" was in fact a political and professional interpretation of economic indicators, based on attacks on center-left parties and their economist theoreticians. Thus, the alliance of center-left parties and professional economists produced a contradiction between political and professional logics, driving cross-field effects. These dynamics were present in each country, but the transnational influence of American economics and political consultants also played a role. At the end of the introductory chapter, Mudge posits a bold claim. By taking party rhetoric as its object of analysis, and utilizing the refraction and field approaches, the book is not debunking competing explanations for the neoliberalization of center-left parties. Rather, it incorporates all of these approaches and moves beyond them. And Mudge delivers. Of course, many new questions arise from the arguments of the book, including how

the racial anxieties of third way Democrats influenced globalization and how imperialism shaped Keynesian economists' analyses of supposedly nationally bounded economies. But few readers will doubt Mudge did what she set out to accomplish.

Yet even as the strength of the methodological approach lies in its ability to incorporate and transcend multiple modes of analysis, I suspect this move will refract (sorry) long-term scholarly debates into struggles over to what degree the refraction approach is explanatory versus descriptive. To her credit, Mudge brings in the concept of Polanyian moment and uses transnational processes to explain forces working on center-left parties across Western nation states. But political sociologists coming from traditions of historical institutionalism, Marxist theories of the state, world systems analysis, or postcolonial theories would make different moves to explain convergence and divergence between cases. Are rightward trajectories of reformist parties overdetermined within a capitalist nation state? Or, was social democrats' foundational "stubborn faith in [technological] progress," as Walter Benjamin put it, to blame? It will be up to the reader to decide for themselves if centering party experts and intraparty struggles adequately narrates the abandonment of Polanyi's dream to end market society. Leaving only the battle of the double movement.

Democratic Unraveling? Review Essay of Adam Przeworski's *Crises of Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019)

BY ALEX HICKS,
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The recent rise of far-right populists into positions of power has led to the erosion of democracy worldwide. For political comparativist Adam Przeworski, democracy principally is the selection of top government officials by universal ballot (p. 5). Today democratic crisis is emerging in the U.S. and many European democracies because of economic exacerbations of citizen grievances and erosions of governmental representative effectiveness (p. 200). Examples of economic exacerbations of grievances have included income stagnation and growing inequality (pp. 103-113). Erosions of representative effectiveness have included failure to improve people's everyday lives in the wake of economic difficulties (p. 205). Focusing on pluralistic aspects of democracy, Przeworski argues that increasing restrictions on minority voting worsen fears, both "expert" and popular, of democracy erosion (p. 152) and even of democratic collapse (p. 7).

Determining causes of our democratic crises is difficult. For example, in *American Discontent*, John Campbell

(2018) is instructive about underlying structural and historical factors--e.g., declining upward mobility and institutional trust, increasing income inequality, poverty, and partisan polarization (pp. 34-63, 74-121)--that appear to have helped set the stage for Trump's 2016 victory. However, although such factors may have accounted for the 2% upward 2012-2016 shifts in the GOP share of the vote versus the Democratic share, Hillary Clinton's share of the popular votes still exceeded Trump's by nearly 2%, and one must, thus, turn to the Electoral College for explanation of Trump's victory. There, good cases for Trump's victory turn to the contingent, for example stressing decisive roles for Green Party voting, Russian trolling and the public release of FBI director Comey's October 2016 letter announcing a reopening of FBI inquiry into Hillary Clinton's email controversy (e.g., Mayer, 2018).

Przeworski leans toward the "contingency" account of Trump's win, writing that "people voted for him because they hated the Clintons, not because of his personality or program" (p. 203). However, on democratic crisis more generally, where Przeworski's main stress is cross-national, he focuses on "underlying structural" factors as sources of democratic collapses. One main emphasis is economic, on factors like the relatively low per capita GDP levels that prevailed in cases like 1933 Germany and 1973 Chile and on more currently relevant conditions like economic stagnation, slump and high income inequality. Other emphases include doubt about the merits of Democratic institutions and strong partisan polarization. Still, despite observing such conditions today, Przeworski is careful to note that full-fledged collapses of democracy as he has defined it, in terms of the selection of top government officials by universal ballot, have not actually occurred in nations of current OECD-level affluence (p. 33).

As Swank et al.'s (2018) "Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe" documents for 16 relatively prosperous Western European democracies, the main proximate threats to democracy are largely confined to radical far-right populist party entries into government. Przeworski does not fully consider risk factors for this rise, including globalization (i.e., merchandise imports from developing nations, capital mobility) and inflows of asylum seekers—factors all positively associated with the radical right-wing populist party vote. In addition, employment protection laws and encompassing, centralized union movements mitigate the positive effects of economic globalization and immigration on the right-wing populist party vote. Further, the universalistic welfare state directly depresses the

vote for radical right-wing populist parties. However, Swank (2019) also finds that this voting share is already undermining the universalistic dimension of welfare state policy.

Przeworski has prognoses beyond those implicit in Swank's news of a decline in the politically moderating effects of the universalistic welfare state. Regarding the future of economic stagnation, slumps, and high income inequality, Przeworski is agnostic; however, he leans toward pessimism where the future of democratic legitimacy is concerned (p. 195). Still, regarding US electoral prospects, Przeworski sees hope in the contingency of the 2016 U.S. electoral outcome and the possibility that the 2020 Presidential election will go well for the Democrats if their presidential candidate is not widely "hated" (p. 203).

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SPECIAL ISSUES

"The Pro-Immigrant Movement in the United States: Political Mobilization from the 2006 Immigration Protests to Trump," edited by Irene Bloemraad and Kim Voss and published in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, January 2019.

Contents:

“Movement or moment? Lessons from the pro-immigrant movement in the United States and contemporary challenges” by Irene Bloemraad and Kim Voss

“Going national: how the fight for immigrant rights became a national social movement” by Walter J. Nicholls, Justus Uitermark, and Sander van Haperen

“Yesterday they marched, today they mobilised the vote: a developmental model for civic leadership among the children of immigrants” by Veronica Terriquez and May Lin

“Do Latinos still support immigrant rights activism? Examining Latino attitudes a decade after the 2006 protest wave” by Sophia Jordán Wallace and Chris Zepeda-Millán

“Local context and labour-community immigrant rights coalitions: a comparison of San Francisco, Chicago, and Houston” by Els de Graauw, Shannon Gleeson, and Xóchitl Bada

“The limits of rights: claims-making on behalf of immigrants” by Kim Voss, Fabiana Silva, and Irene Bloemraad

“Political mobilisation and public discourse in new immigrant destinations: news media characterisations of immigrants during the 2006 immigration marches” by Laura López-Sanders and Hana E. Brown

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“Seattle+20: Movements at the Millennium,” edited by Hillary Lazar and Ben Manski and published by *Socialism and Democracy*, Volume 33, No.3, November 2019.

Twenty years after the so-called “Battle in Seattle” and the millennial turn, *Socialism and Democracy* is releasing a special issue dealing with the 1990s-2010s period of struggle in the United States.

Articles include empirical analyses and personal accounts of the popular movements of this period.

Contributors include Sofya Aptekar, Rishi Awatramini, Jeremy Brecher, Bill Fletcher Jr., Shannon Marie Gleeson, Chris Hardnack, Walda Katz-Fishman, Hillary Lazar, Ben Manski, Suren Moodliar, Marcel Paret, John E. Peck Jr., Jerome Scott, Marina Sitrin, Jackie Smith, Norman Stockwell, Dominic Wetzel, and Lesley Wood.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Nandita Sharma is starting a new research project tentatively titled: Home Invasions: The Significance of “Foreign Rule” in Concepts of Colonialism.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGISTS IN THE NEWS

Luft, Aliza. "Dehumanization and the Normalization of Violence: It’s Not What You Think." Social Science Research Council. https://items.ssrc.org/insights/dehumanization-and-the-normalization-of-violence-its-not-what-you-think/

Pettinicchio, David. "Why Disabled Americans Remain Second-Class Citizens." *Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/23/why-disabled-americans-remain-second-class-citizens/

Pettinicchio, David. "The Bipartisan Failure to Address Long-Term Home-Based Care for Disabled Americans." *The American Prospect.* https://prospect.org/health/bipartisan-failure-address-long-term-home-based-care-disabled-americans/

Reyes, Victoria. September 4, 2019. “For Some Children Born Abroad, US Citizenship Has Never Been a Guarantee.” *The Conversation.* https://theconversation.com/for-some-children-born-abroad-us-citizenship-has-never-been-a-guarantee-122704

Sharma, Nandita, 2019. “3 Reasons Why No Borders is Essential for the Working Class.” *Fabian Review.* September. https://fabians.org.uk/goodbye-to-borders/

Sharma, Nandita, 2019. “What is the Left Case for Open Borders?” *State of Nature*, January 31. (Also re-printed in *Political Critique*, February 13.)

Sobieraj, Sarah. 2019. "Disinformation, Democracy, and the Social Cost of Identity-Based Attacks Online." *Media Well.* https://mediawell.ssrc.org/expert-reflections/disinformation-democracy-and-the-social-costs-of-identity-based-attacks-online/

NEW DATA: Comparative Taxation Dataset

We announce the availability of a new dataset that may be of use to scholars of this section, the Comparative Taxation Dataset, available through ICPSR at this URL:
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/37365/versions/V1.

The study covers 40 countries and areas from 1870-2001. The collection includes variables on taxation, as well as other relevant variables such as economically active population, infant mortality rates, unemployment, indices of industrial production, output of crude petroleum, output of natural gas, output of electrical energy, money supply, total central government expenditure and revenue, political parties, wholesale price indices, consumer price indices and other variables. Sources include International Historical Statistics (2003) and Peter Flora, State economy and society in Western Europe, 1815-1975 (1987).

The construction of this dataset is made possible by National Science Foundation (NSF) grant number SES-0847725. Please cite as:

Anderson, Elisabeth, Monica Prasad, and Andre Nickow. 2019. Comparative Taxation Dataset on 40 Countries and Areas, 1870-2001. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-08-29. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR37365.v1

NEW DATA: New Harmonized International Social Survey Data Available

The Survey Data Recycling (SDR) project has deposited master data files with full documentation for access and use for cross-national analyses. In SDR.1 version, survey data are derived from 22 well-known international social survey projects and include 1,721 national surveys covering 142 countries between 1966 and 2013, combined with national attribute statistics. The harmonized variables are especially relevant for those studying comparative social stratification, population change, protest and political participation. Documentation and data files in version SDR.1 are available for download at Harvard Dataverse: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/sdr. Currently the SDR.2 project is sponsored by the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, the Dept. of Sociology, Ohio State University, and the Polish Academy of Sciences, and it is directed by K. Maciek Slomczynski, Irina Tomescu-Dubrow and J. Craig Jenkins. Drawing on National Science Foundation funding (#1738502), SDR.2 will deposit for public access an extended dataset for ca. 3,500 national surveys with harmonized variables pertaining to political participation, social capital and well-being. An overview of the methodological approach is available at https://www.asc.ohio-state.edu/dataharmonization/publications/).

REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK:
ASA Committee on the Status of LGBTQ People in Sociology

The ASA Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer People in Sociology seeks feedback from all ASA members on issues that may be faced by LGBTQ people within the association or the broader discipline. Such issues may be within the areas of education, workplace, research, visibility, and others. Historically, we have engaged in educational outreach efforts, conducted research on specific questions or problems, and proposed policy initiatives based on ASA member concerns. However, we are open to all feedback and new ways to support LGBTQ people within the discipline. In addition, if you are just interested in learning more about the committee, please feel free to reach out. To provide feedback, make us aware of an issue, or express interest, please email our ASA staff liaison, Jean Shin (ASA's Director of Diversity and Inclusion) atjshin@asanet.org. Jean will forward the information to the committee.

NEW NEWSLETTER: Survey Data Harmonization

Survey data harmonization and big data are innovative forces that are leading to new, emergent and interdisciplinary knowledge across the social sciences. The Survey Data Recycling (SDR) project, funded by National Science Foundation (#1738502), is sponsoring a newsletter on survey harmonization: "Harmonization: Newsletter on Survey Data Harmonization in the Social Sciences." The newsletter provides a forum for researchers to share news and communicate with the growing community of scholars, institutions and government agencies who work on harmonizing social survey data and other projects with similar focus. It pays special attention to the methodology of survey data harmonization and contributes to the development of international research and standards on methodological issues such as data comparability, data quality, proper data documentation, and data storage and access, as well as analytic procedures that can contend with the demands of harmonized data. The current issue for Volume 5, No. 1 and back issues as well as signups for the newsletter are available at: https://www.asc.ohio-state.edu/dataharmonization/newsletter/

UPCOMING CONFERENCES

South Asian Media and Cultural Studies (SMACS) conference
"*Rising Voices" in South Asian Media & Cultural Studies*
February 6-7, 2020
Center for Global and Multicultural Engagement, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida

Interdisciplinary Conference on "Democracy under Threat in Times of Populism and Racial Nationalism"
April 10-11, 2020
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities

NOMINATIONS FOR 2020 SECTION AWARDS

You are invited to submit your nominations for the 2020 Political Sociology Section Awards. The deadline for nominations is ***March 15, 2020***. The winners will be notified and announced prior to the ASA meetings.

The Distinguished Career Award in Political Sociology

The Distinguished Career Award recognizes and celebrates a lifetime of contributions to the area(s) of political sociology. Nominations will be judged on the depth and breadth of the scholar's impact on political sociology over the course of their career. Nominees must be at least a quarter of a century beyond graduating with their Ph.D.

Section members may nominate a distinguished scholar by sending: 1) a letter (PDF or MSWord) of nomination, which outlines the candidate's scholarly contributions to the field and provides assurance of the candidate's willingness to be nominated; 2) a copy of the candidate's most recent curriculum vitae, and 3) the full contact information for the nominee (including email address), to the nominating committee below.

The Distinguished Career Award Committee:
Richard Lachmann, University at Albany-SUNY (Chair) RL605@albany.edu
Rebecca Emigh, UCLA emigh@soc.ucla.edu
Jeff Goodwin, New York University jeff.goodwin@nyu

The Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship Book Award in Political Sociology

This award is given annually to the outstanding recent book in political sociology (we will not consider edited books for this award). To be eligible, the book must have a 2019 copyright date. The selection committee encourages self-nominations or suggestions of work by others. Nominations from publishers will not be accepted.

To nominate a book for this award: 1) send a short letter (via e-mail) nominating the book to each committee member below and 2) have a copy of the book sent to each committee member, at the addresses below.

Chair: Geneviève Zubrzycki, genez@umich.edu
University of Michigan
Weiser Center for Europe and Eurasia
500 S. Church Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1042

David Brady, david.brady@ucr.edu
School of Public Policy
INTS 4151
900 University Ave.
Riverside, CA 92521

Isaac Martin, iwmartin@ucsd.edu
University of California, San Diego
Isaac Martin, #0517
Social Sciences, Room 315
7835 Trade St., Suite 100
San Diego, CA 92121

The Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship for an Article or Chapter Award for Political Sociology

This award is offered annually for the outstanding recently published article or chapter in political sociology. To be eligible, submissions must have a 2019 publication date. The selection committee encourages either self-nominations or suggestions of work by others. (Please note that each author may have only one article nominated.) Please submit the following to the selection committee at their email addresses listed below: 1) a brief nomination letter and 2) a copy of the article or chapter.

The Best Article or Book Chapter Award Committee:
Hana Brown, Wake Forest University (Chair), brownhe@wfu.edu
Cybelle Fox, UC Berkeley, cfox@berkeley.edu
Yan Long, UC Berkeley, longyan@berkeley.edu

Best Graduate Student Paper Award

This award is offered annually for the best graduate student paper in political sociology. Persons who were graduate students at any time during calendar year 2019 are invited to submit published or unpublished papers for this award. To be eligible, papers must be either single authored or co-authored by two or more graduate students. Articles co-authored (and/or subsequently published jointly) by a faculty and a student are not eligible. Please note that each author may have only one article nominated. Please submit: 1) a brief nomination letter and 2) a copy of the article or chapter. All materials should be sent to each selection committee member at the e-mail addresses below.

Rachel Best, University of Michigan (Chair), rkb@umich.edu
Marco Garrido, University of Chicago, garrido@uchicago.edu
Rachel Wetts, Brown University, rachel_wetts@brown.edu

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY JOB CANDIDATES

Joshua A. Basseches
Northwestern University
Website: www.joshuabasseches.com
Research Interests: Political Sociology; Environmental Sociology; Economic Sociology; Public Policy (especially energy and climate policy); Social Movements and Interest Groups; Legislative Process and Procedures; U.S. State Politics; Sociology of Law; Comparative-Historical Sociology

Bio: Basseches' research focuses on state-level climate policy and politics in the United States. Given that the political power of private interests is generally assumed to be the primary impediment to federal climate policy, his dissertation asks why the same interests have been unable to prevent so much progress in the states, where political scientists predict business influence to be even greater. He finds that even in the so-called "leading states" there is significant variation in the quality of the policies that have been adopted. After accounting for the role of social movement organizations, public opinion, and a range of other interest groups, he ultimately explains this variation in terms of differences in the policy preferences and political power of particular private interests, most pivotally the investor-owned utilities. His previous work focusing on social movement influence in the design of state-level climate policy has been published in Mobilization.

Johnnie Lotesta
Postdoctoral Fellow, Ash Center for Democratic Governance & Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School
Website: https://ash.harvard.edu/people/johnnie-lotesta
Research interests: Political Sociology, Cultural Sociology, Sociology of Knowledge & Expertise, Labor, Social Movements, Organizations, Public Policy, Social Theory, Methods

Bio: Johnnie is a Postdoctoral Democracy Fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Harvard Kennedy School. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from Brown University in 2019. Johnnie is broadly interested in American political development, particularly political parties, policy change and divergence, postwar conservatism, labor and social movements, and organized interest groups. Preliminarily titled "Rightward in the Rustbelt: How Conservatives Remade the GOP, 1947-2012," Johnnie's book project examines the Republican Party's post-2010 embrace of once marginal libertarian policy positions through a comparative-historical analysis of right-to-work laws in three Industrial Midwestern states: Michigan, Indiana and

Ohio. In other projects, Johnnie examines the role policy experts and political professionals play in the representation of collective problems, the formulation of party platforms, and the advancement of new legislative programs. Her published work has appeared in Research in Political Sociology and the American Journal of Cultural Sociology, among other outlets. Johnnie's research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, the Brown University BEO Program, and the Tobin Project.

Ben Manski
UC Santa Barbara
Website: www.BenManski.com
Research Interests:
Social Movements, Constitutionalism, Public Law, Democratic Transitions, Global Governance, Climate Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology

Bio: I study the participation of ordinary people in the deliberate constitution of their societies. My work is driven by a personal commitment to building democracy as a means of resolving otherwise intractable social and ecological problems and achieving durable systemic change. My research takes in social movements, law, politics, technology, climate and ecology, and I have published widely on these themes. At present I am a PhD candidate in Sociology at UC Santa Barbara; I expect to defend my thesis in April. I also hold a JD from the University of Wisconsin Law School. My dissertation, "The Constitutional Revolution: Strategies of Movement and Powers of Structure in the Global Pursuit of Democracy," is the basis for a book under contract with Routledge. I am a Liberty Tree Fellow, Critical Realism Network Associated Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies Associate Fellow, and Next System Project Research Fellow.

Michael L. Rosino
University of Connecticut, Department of Sociology
Website: michaelrosino.com
Research interests: Race and ethnicity; political sociology; collective action; media; qualitative methods; theory

Bio: Michael L. Rosino is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Connecticut. His research examines racial politics in parties, power, public debates, media, and collective action. His work has appeared in Social Currents, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, and Ethnic and Racial Studies. His dissertation research, a multisite ethnographic case study concurrent with the 2016 election, examines how the participants of a progressive grassroots party in the Northeast engage with issues of racial and political inequality through their identities, habits, and political strategies. It sheds light on possibilities for equitable and inclusive grassroots democracy and

advances understandings of racial politics grounded in everyday social life. His first book, *Debating the Drug War: Race, Politics, and the Media*, is forthcoming with Routledge Press. It demonstrates the influence of political ideologies and identities and implicit and explicit racial meaning within mass and digital media in the debate over drug policy.

J Sterphone
University of California, Santa Barbara; Universität Bielefeld
Website: www.josephsterphone.com
Research Interests: race and racism, political sociology, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, national memory, nationhood and nationalism, comparative historical sociology

Bio: Joseph Sterphone is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara and will be a visiting Fulbright Fellow at Universität Bielefeld during the 2019-20 academic year. His dissertation explores the co-constitution of race and nation in contemporary Germany, asking if and how race matters for understandings of German nationhood in everyday interactions in mainstream German society. Moreover, he studies how Germans maintain their belief in a Germany that is a "space free of race" while nevertheless contending with a range of ways in which membership in racial categories is potentially consequential. His dissertation research employs conversation analytic and ethnomethodologically-informed discourse-historical methods to understand the ways in which everyday members (re)produce German and white as overlapping categories. As an extension of his interest in how participants manage employing potentially sanctionable categories in interaction, he also conducts research on conflict, norm orientations, and category-relevance among players of historical war games. His research has been published in Populist Nationalism in Europe and the Americas, EC Psychology and Psychiatry, and Aggression and Violent Behavior.

Jared M. Wright
Purdue University
Website: https://jaredmwr.wordpress.com/
Research Interests: Computational Research Methods, Digital Sociology, Political Sociology, Social Movements, Hacktivism, Privacy, Surveillance, Intellectual Property, Algorithmic Bias
Bio: I am currently a Doctoral candidate in Sociology at Purdue University, expected graduation date May 2020. My research focuses on digital and political sociology, along with both computational and qualitative research methods. Broadly, I am interested in how new technology and social media influence power dynamics and inequalities in societies. Specifically, much of my work focuses on how technology is used in innovative ways at the grassroots level to mobilize collective action and challenge traditional power structures in new ways. My dissertation analyzes movements engaged in what I call "digital contention"; that is, political contention over the freedom of

the Internet, including the Free/Open Source Software movement, the Digital Rights movement, and the Anonymous hacktivist movement. I explore how digital space shapes perception and framing of political opportunities and threats, collective identity, and solidarity among these activist movements. I am also interested in how digital contention impacts Internet policy and governance.

Mustafa Yavas
Yale University
Website: https://sociology.yale.edu/people/mustafa-yavas

Research interests: Economic Sociology, Political Sociology, Social Networks, Sociology of Work, Social Movements, Computational Sociology, Social Theory

Bio: My research centers on political and economic sociology, and relies on both qualitative and computational methods. In my dissertation, “White-Collar Blues? The Making of the Global Middle Class in Turkey,” I explore the intertwined processes of globalization and class formation, focusing on the quality of work life of elite Turkish business professionals in Istanbul and New York City. Drawing from over 100 interviews, I examine this differentiating stratum through three key moments of the employment life course: selection into, surviving within, and opting-out of high-prestige, high-salary jobs at transnational corporations. This research builds on my previous works on various boundary processes in social, economic, and political settings, including homophily in social networks, income segregation, and collective identity formation. Additionally, I am working on mapping the field of political opinion in Turkey and its change over time to better understand the role of media in the contemporary dynamics of democratic backsliding.