The West Enders become most suspicious of, and hostile toward, the outside world when they must deal with government and the law. Most West Enders are convinced that the police, the government bureaucracy, the elected officials, and the courts are corrupt and are engaged in a never-ending conspiracy to deprive the citizens of what is morally theirs. Although suspicion of government and politics can be found among all social strata, in smaller communities as well as in the city, the West Ender’s feelings on this subject are more intense and less open to change. Consequently, they try to have as little to do with government as possible and pass on to the area politician the task of dealing with it in their behalf.

By government, West Enders mean city government. There is almost no interest in state government, even though the State House is located less than half a mile from...

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Symposium Continued…

science departments. As a result, junior scholars arrive “tech-ed-up” and tend to work on topics that allow them to showcase their ability to use the sophisticated modeling skills or the statistical methods that they recently learned in graduate school.

Political sociology, by contrast, is more loosely organized around particular problems and themes such as social movements, democratization, and economic reform. There is no special premium placed on methodological sophistication; and qualitative studies are common. One consequence is that political sociologists are more likely to ask the “big” questions about politics. And they are more likely to focus their answers on interconnections among different elements of a polity. In terms of theory, political sociology is obviously much less engaged with rational choice modeling (Edgar Kiser: you are a big outlier). Instead, research takes its cue from both classical social theory (i.e., the issues originally raised by Marx, Weber, DuBois, and so on) and more contemporary mid-range theories (e.g., resource mobilization theory, state-centric theory, and balance of class power theory). Theoretical combinations and syntheses are common.

When compared to political sociology, political science research on American politics seems excessively narrow. Granted, we do need some specialized work and there is certainly nothing wrong per se with having excellent technical skills. But when specialization and a concern with technique lead scholars to lose sight of important substantive questions, then serious problems arise. And political science research on U.S. politics is too directed toward trivial issues that are of little concern outside of academic circles. Too many political scientists simply cannot explain why their research topic is of importance to the educated public.

As a researcher with strong ties to both political science and sociology, I see the central challenge as making political science work on the United States more exciting and more like the research that takes place in political sociology. So my view is: scholars in political sociology who work on the United States should continue what they are doing. If the specialized research in political science happens to have some relevance, then obviously it should be consulted. Otherwise, leave it alone. Of course, there are important exceptions in political science of scholars who work on the United States and engage bread and butter sociological issues such as race, class, and gender and who do look at the American polity as a whole. This is especially true for historically-oriented researchers in area of “American Political Development” (APD), which includes scholars like Jacob Hacker, Ira Katznelson, Paul Pierson, and Theda Skocpol (the latter, of course, also a sociologist). I do not see any real difference between this APD work and more historical work in political sociology.

I have focused here on the study of U.S. politics. Once we move outside of the U.S., however, these conclusions about political sociology and political science quickly break down. The field of comparative politics in political science is a different story. Comparativists in political science are methodologically eclectic and theoretically open-minded. And they produce most of the best work in the social sciences on the politics of non-U.S. countries and regions (esp. on Africa, Asia, and Latin America). Political sociology tends to have, I think, too strong of a U.S. and Europe focus (the same is true of sociology more generally). Some graduate courses on political sociology even engage only questions about the U.S. and Europe. So political science seems to have its own lesson for political sociology, and it has to do with bringing the people and politics of Africa, Asia, and Latin America into the mix much more than is currently true. Political sociology would be enriched if it followed this lesson.

John Skrentny, University of California-San Diego

I still remember the day as a young graduate student that I walked into Theda Skocpol's office to ask about political sociology and political science. I admired the way she was able to engage these different disciplines so fully. How was this possible? Given the insularity of disciplines (and subfields within disciplines, and sub-subfields within disciplines), it seemed impossible to engage multiple disciplines in any meaningful way. But she had clearly done it.

The relationship between these two disciplines has long fascinated me, and it’s something I think all of us have struggled with every time we’ve taught a lecture or seminar on “Political Sociology” or found very helpful sources in the APSR. To get us talking about our fields, I’ve organized a panel with leading border-crossing sociologists (Edwin Amenta, Jeff Manza, Peter Evans) and political scientists (Jennifer Hochschild, Kim Williams) to discuss the issues.

Since grad school days, I have learned that though the boundaries separating political sociology and political science are not as fortified as they appear, there are differences between the fields. Specifically, there are differences in the two fields’ insularity, subject matter, and research styles or approaches.

Before I get to the differences, I want to emphasize that there are, of course, significant similarities. For example, there are many subject areas where scholars read--and cite--each other, and are truly taking part in a common project. This can be seen in the field of American Political Development, where Skocpol’s work and movement between the disciplines has brought many scholars together. But there are many joint projects in other areas, such as law and society (some sociologists might be surprised to learn that Michael McCann is a political scientist), comparative politics (those studying welfare states often ignore disciplinary boundaries, as do students of nationalism and immigration), and international relations (bigger separations here, but political scientist Peter Katzenstein is a leader in the field who creatively absorbs insights from all fields, including political sociology). Those studying social movements cross disciplinary boundaries and I suspect many have forgotten the disciplinary affiliations of many of this subfield’s leading lights.

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Now, on to the differences. These are obviously based on my perceptions, and I’m quite certain readers will be able to think of several counter examples. Still, I think the general patterns fit what I describe below.

First, institutionally, political science is more open to political sociology than the other way around. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset and Theda Skocpol have both been presidents of the APSA; I don’t think any political scientist has been president of the ASA. It is not uncommon for APSA to give awards to political sociologists (e.g., off the top of my head I recall that Rebecca Klatich, Mabel Berezin, and most recently, Nadav Gabay, a recent PhD student in my own department, have all won awards from APSA). According to the Political Sociology Section website, we’ve given an award to a political science book only once (in 2001 for Jacobs and Shapiro’s Politicians Don’t Pander).

Second, I think political science is more open in terms of subject matter. There are many topics in political science that sociologists do not touch, but I don’t know of any ideas, topics, or concepts that political sociologists study that political scientists do not also study (though not with the same energy or interest; see below). For instance, though sociologists and political scientists will talk about the “state,” sociologists seem to have an unwritten rule not to discuss specific state institutions in any detailed way. When I was working on my first book and I needed to understand how the presidency or courts worked, I had to rely on political science. And I felt odd writing about these institutions—I sensed it was somehow beyond political sociology’s normal boundaries.

An exception here is administrative government, though some of the key insights here have come from sociologists more identified with the sociology of law than political sociology (specifically, Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet).

In terms of style or approach, it is clear to anyone glancing through American Sociological Review and American Political Science Review that political science is far more enamored of rational choice approaches than is political sociology. But there are other differences in style and approach.

One especially salient difference to me is that political sociologists are more advanced than political scientists when theorizing the effects of culture. This is, of course, a generalization, and there are numerous counter-examples (especially the work of William Sewell and Erik Bleich). But one is much more likely to find older terms such as “values” and “ideas” in political science used without much elaboration. Political scientists use uncritically the (Parsonian?) concept of “norms” (e.g., Mendelberg 2001), and in international relations, where “norm” is a key concept in the study of human rights, political scientists often cite the legal scholar Cass Sunstein for the cultural theory behind the “norm cascade” (see, for example Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 International Organization).

In contrast, political sociologists develop and explore cultural concepts with more enthusiasm. See, for example, the work of Frank Dobbin on policy paradigms (Dobbin built on political scientist Peter Hall’s work, doing more with the concept), Lis Clemens on cultural repertoires, and Brian Steensland on frames. My own work, which emphasizes taken-for-granted meanings and boundaries, is explicitly in dialog with cultural sociology.

Finally, though I think political scientists are more open to different subject matter than are sociologists, their emphases are on the areas that political sociologists typically do not study. For example, I suspect that every political science department has a specialist who studies Congress, but though there are many political scientists who study marginalized groups, one is less likely to find a political scientist who focuses on gender, or race, or welfare policy, or social movements. In political sociology, it is precisely these areas where much of the action is.

**John D. Stephens, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill**

Most political science departments are composed of four fields: US politics, comparative politics, international relations, and political theory (which most sociologist would classify as philosophy, so not theory in a sociological sense). Increasingly, method is becoming a fifth field. As Jim Mahoney notes, the overlap between comparative politics and political sociology is the greatest of the fields of political science. For this reason and because this is the field that I teach in since moving from a sociology department (Brown) to a political science department (Northwestern and later UNC) in 1985, I will focus my comparison of political sociology and political science on comparative politics.

Almost all of the work of comparative politics scholars would be recognized as political sociology by sociologists. Nevertheless, I do think there are a number of emphases in comparative politics which are much rarer in political sociology. I discuss three such differences here: rational choice analysis in political behavior studies, political institutions, and historical analysis. Rational choice analysis is much more common in political science in general. The basic education of sociologists inoculates them from this approach. We are taught from day one in introduction to sociology that members of society acquire values and norms through socialization. This view is shared by structural functionalists and conflict sociologists alike. The latter are likely to view socialization as occurring at the sub-group level with the sub-groups shaped by the dominant cleavage structure of a society. For example, in studies of Western European politics, the historically given cleavage structure as defined by the Lipset-Rokkan scheme is the starting point for studies of political behavior. Parties, unions, churches, social movements, etc. are seen as both actors and agents of socialization. The notion that one can understand political behavior by simply reading off preferences (or “utilities”) from a person’s location in the economic structure is alien to most sociologists. This difference is
closely related to the influence of Downsian spatial models of political behavior in political science. Such models assume that voter preferences are fixed and that parties appeal to the median voter in order to maximize votes and/or the probability of achieving governmental positions. The structural cleavage model, on the other hand, assumes that parties are in large part agents of subcultures which attempt to achieve government position in order to move society in the direction of the values of the subculture. Thus, parties devote at least as much effort to influencing the views of the median voter as they do to adjusting their platform to that voter's views. This contrast between sociology and political science in the study of parties and political behavior is also closely related to the much greater influence of formal modeling in political science. Formal models are invariably, one is tempted to say necessarily, based on rational choice analysis and spatial models of voting.

Rational choice analysis is also the basis for the large literature on the effect of political institutions on policy making, coalition formation, and electoral outcomes. In Bringing the State Back In, Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) identify three state effects hypothesized by comparative political sociology at the time: state capacity, the effect of the state as an actor autonomous of societal forces, and the “Tocquevillian” effect of state structure. In the case of the latter, they draw on Tocqueville’s analysis of the effect of state centralization on the course of the French Revolution, an analysis which Skocpol greatly extended in her 1979 book on the major social revolutions. Among political scientists, the interest in political institutions is in such (often unintended) Tocquevillian effects. The structures of interest are usually but not always constitutional rules of the game. By now, there is a very large literature with a long history on the effect of electoral rules on coalition formation.

Another focus of interest has been how veto points in the policy making process affect legislative outcomes. A third difference between political sociology and comparative politics in political science is the relative neglect of history in comparative politics. Political scientists are aware, of course, that the countries they are studying have histories that are relevant to the interpretation of present day politics. Moreover, they do venture into the past to explain the present. Recent works by Kathleen Thelen, Cathie Jo Martin, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice on the 19th century social and historical origins of the contemporary varieties of capitalism are some examples of excellent historical work that is being done in political science.

However, political scientists rarely go back in history to explain developments of the past, even very important ones. It is no accident that work on social revolutions, state building, and the historical development of democracy has been overwhelmingly dominated by sociologists. Political science would never have produced Charles Tilly (or should I say that Charles Tilly would never have chosen to pursue a doctorate in political science rather than sociology). That speaks volumes about the limitations of my adoptive discipline.

David S. Meyer, University of California-Irvine

Sociology meetings are generally more fun, but political science negotiates better room rates. Sociology treats virtually everything as fair game for inquiry, including immigration, sexuality, medicine, music, animals, organizations, and politics—and so much else. Stumble into a random room at a national meeting and it’s almost like a grade school grab bag; you don’t know what you’ll get, but it will take about twenty minutes. Political scientists focus on power. Walk into almost (more about that qualification below) any panel at a Political Science meeting and you’ll see, at least, the shadows of the state. If you avoid political theory, you’ll be able to follow the basic outlines of whatever goes on. I’ve lived in both worlds for most of my professional life, and figuring out how each discipline works—and works on me—is the closest thing to ethnography that I’ve ever done. Here’s what happened:

I’ve been interested in social and political change from the bottom roughly since adolescence kicked in. I went to college with a commitment to that interest, but no corresponding commitment to discipline or disciplines. Mostly, I read good books, and wrote a senior thesis on social change examining the works of Shelley and Thoreau. Sometime during that senior year, however, I began to doubt Shelley’s dictum that the poets were “the unacknowledged legislators of the world.” Maybe, I thought, they were unacknowledged because they didn’t much matter. Maybe, creating a powerful metaphor didn’t really spur political revolution. I went to graduate school in political science to figure out why social movements sometimes emerged and how they sometimes mattered. I learned that changes in public policy were both a provocation and an outcome of social movements, and that the whole process was awfully complicated—not so easy to model.

I resisted the discipline, which was mostly enforced by the major subfields. I was studying an American movement, the nuclear freeze, while most of the work on movements was done by Comparativists, not Americanists. I was interested in theory, but the only empirical material most Theorists confronted was texts, and Theory was mostly segregated from the other fields. My case was about foreign policy, so people told me I was really in International Relations. What a mess! I learned to describe my work as about political behavior or interest groups or public policy, but the labels never covered much of what I was doing. I lived in a political science department, teaching institutions (The Presidency, Congress, and so on), but started sneaking out with Sociologists on the side.

Social Movements were one of two score major fields in Sociology. As near as I could tell, overlaps among the fields were completely normal and the boundaries weren’t really marked in any case. I didn’t have to make a case for the legitimacy of my academic concerns, and the discipline as a whole presented as theoretically oriented and methodologically pluralistic.
Symposium Continued...

Hundreds of scholars identified as political sociologists, and hundreds more identified as social movements specialists. (To my amazement, last time I looked, less than 20 percent of this huge group overlapped.)

When I moved to a Sociology department, friendly tips about what to teach clued me in. While Political Theorists were a distinct species within Political Science, everyone in Sociology had to confront Sociological Theory. The ghosts of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim animate—or haunt—contemporary empirical work in Sociology, while the ghosts of Plato and Machiavelli can only look on with envy, muttering when data appears. “Teaching social problems is like teaching public policy,” advised one friend, who had moved the other way, “just spend much more time on each problem.” When I wrote to colleagues for sample syllabi, I was astonished to learn that—aside from theory and stats—there was no standard—or even common, template for a basic course. The virtue of diversity can produce a deficit in coherence that extends from the classroom to research.

The Political Scientists’ concerns with state structures or policy outcomes appear in the glorious potpourri that define the study of social movements in Sociology, but sometimes recede behind emotions, life histories, symbolic performances, narrative, religion, networks—and so much else. The Political Scientists’ more narrow focus may provide a better foundation for the cumulation of knowledge, albeit on a more narrow subject of inquiry. (Now, as a sociologist, I understand this is dilemma Weber outlined nearly 100 years ago.) As a scholar, the challenge is to read vigorously across disciplines. Insight lurks in the interstices.

MOBILITY TABLES

Paul Lachelier is now an Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Stetson University

Susan C. Pearce is now an Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology at East Carolina University

Melanie Hughes is now an Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology at University of Pittsburgh

Cheol-Sung Lee is now an Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology at University of Chicago

EDITOR’S NOTE AND CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Thanks to all the contributors to this issue. Please keep submitting the dissertation and book abstracts.

In the next issue, I would like to have a symposium on “The 2008 U.S. Election.” I invite submissions on this theme. As always, I will invite a handful of contributors. But, this is always an imperfect approach to pulling in section members, and all section members should feel encouraged to offer to contribute. Just send me an email and express interest. I will wait until after the election to publish the newsletter, so contributors will have the opportunity to analyze what happened.

Finally, please feel encouraged to contribute anything you have to say to the section on politics, political sociology or sociology in general. I’d like the newsletter to be a home for your provocative and interesting debate on a host of issues. If you have published an op-ed in a newspaper recently, please suggest we reprint it here. If you have a letter to write in response to something in the newsletter, I’ll publish that as well. Submissions should be sent to my email below. Best regards,

Dave Brady
brady@soc.duke.edu

DON’T FORGET!! THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY RECEPTION WILL BE FRIDAY, AUGUST 1 AT NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY. This is an off-site location. The reception will be at the Alumni Center at Northeastern U., 6th floor of Columbus Place, 716 Columbus Avenue. For directions, see: http://www.northeastern.edu/campusmap/map/interactive.html
the West End, and even though an Italian occupied the governor’s chair during the time of my study. There is even less interest in the doings of the federal government. In 1958, the local congressman was an Irish-man who lived in East Boston and paid little attention to the West End. At that time, John F. Kennedy was a United States Senator, and even though people sometimes mentioned that he was a West End boy – because he had attended the parish church as a child – he was too far removed from the area by his high office and took no direct interest in it. There was occasional criticism of the then President Eisenhower, but the comments were much like those made about mass media personalities, and dealt with rumors about his personal life. State and federal government are far removed from the concerns of most West Enders; their existence is noticed only when some issue develops with relevance to them.

The West Enders’ conception of government and its officials also sheds further light on the dominating role of the peer group society. As already noted, West Enders think of government primarily as an agency that should be an arm of the peer group society to satisfy their needs. Moreover, they conceive the governmental process to be much like personal relationships in the peer group society. Thus, government agencies are identified with the individuals who run them, and agency behavior is explained in terms of their personal motives. During the time of my study, for example, West Enders were naturally concerned with redevelopment, which brought the Housing Authority and the Mayor into their view. The West Enders, however, spoke not of agencies but of individuals in them, notably one leading Authority official and the Mayor. They felt these two men were in the pay of the private redevelopers, and were tearing down the West End for personal gain.

Government agencies have no reality; the city is seen as a congeries of individuals, most of whom are corrupt. Although West Enders know bribery to be wrong, for instance, they do not hesitate to bribe a policeman to prevent a traffic ticket. They believe that in either case the money they pay goes into someone’s pocket. To them, there is thus no difference between the payoff to the policeman and the fine that is paid to the traffic court, and both go to the outside world.

The personalization of government operations stems in part from the West Enders’ inability to recognize the existence of object-oriented bureaucracies. The idea that individual officials follow rules and regulations based not on personal morality but on concepts of efficiency, order, administrative hierarchy and the like, is difficult to accept. For example, when the redevelopment agency initiated its procedures for taking title to the West End properties, and for relocating people and demolishing houses, West Enders refused to believe that these procedures were based on local and federal regulations. They saw them only as individual, and individually motivated, acts. Taking title to the land was described as a land grab to benefit the redeveloper. Relocation was explained in terms of the desire of the redeveloper and his governmental partners to push West Enders out of their homes as quickly as possible, so that the new buildings could be put up. The protests of redevelopment officials that they were only following standard operating procedures went unheeded.

Since the government is viewed as consisting of individual actors, West Enders evaluate it on the basis of the same moral code that they apply to each other. Government officials are expected to act on the basis of absolute and unvarying principles, to treat West Enders as equals, and to respect the patterns of mutual obligation that operate in the peer group. As a result, West Enders hold to a conception of “good government” that is as strict if not stricter than that of the middle-class reformer. Their conception differs only in substance. Middle-class reformers define good government by the extent to which it follows business concepts of efficiency, fairness and honesty in contractual relations, and the allocation of resources by middle-class priorities – be these liberal or conservative in ideology. West Enders judge good government by peer group rules and by the extent to which its allocation policies fit their interests. Thus, they described middle-class reform movements in Boston as nothing more than a shifting of the draft from the pockets of politicians to those of bankers and businessmen. Conversely, the regime of Mayor James Curley, long considered as one of the most corrupt by the middle class, was generally praised by the West Enders because it respected and benefited the poor people. Evidence of graft and corruption in his administration were not denied; they were simply compared to the much larger amounts of profit made in the assignment of contracts to private business when government was run by businessmen. This they called “legal graft.” Since West Enders judge the law by the extent to which it benefits or hurts them, they fact that the business reform administration acted within the limits of the written law was not considered relevant.

West Enders see that, most of the time, government does not act as they would wish it to and that it is exploiting or depriving them of their rights. This, they also explain in peer group society terms. Thus, the people who conduct government business are individuals gone wrong, motivated by greed and ambition, and unable to control their desires. They have been corrupted by the object-goals of the outside world. As I noted in Chapter 4, West Enders are disappointed that individuals in government do not act like peer group members, and they express great admiration for the honest cop or government official. Such individuals are rare, however, for few can act as West Enders would wish them to. Since West Enders think that the majority of government officials are out to exploit them, they feel justified to do likewise if and when the need arises. They avoid contact with the government as much as they can, but should it threaten to exploit them, they feel free to retaliate. For example, when the city took over the West End and, in effect, became its landlord, West Enders demanded that redevelopment officials rehabilitate buildings that had just been declared a slum. Some refused to pay rent in order to get even with the city.

Such a conception of the governmental process, and of government-citizen relationships, may indeed seem irrational to the middle-class person who learns early in life to understand bureaucratic organization and behavior. And, as I have already

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Classic in Political Sociology Continued...

And, as I have already noted, it may also appear to be paranoid. Only a clinician can make judgments about individual pathology. But given the West Enders’ status in the larger society, their view of the outside world is neither irrational nor a sign of group paranoia. No group can long retain a conceptual system that does not stand up against experience. For while the West Enders’ explanation of government behavior may be distorted, it fits the phenomena they observe more often than not.

There are several reasons for the ‘fit’ of the West Enders’ theory. In the first place, most of them have had little direct experience with bureaucratic organizations. Few of them work in offices, either in private industry or in the government. Moreover, since Boston’s political life is still firmly in the control of the Irish population, few Italians have even tried to find jobs in government offices. They described sardonically the experience of a North Ender who had tried and failed for years to get a job in a city department—until he changed his long Sicilian name to Foley. Consequently, West Enders see the bureaucracy only from the position of the client. And, since bureaucracies do not generally explain the reasons for their actions to clients, there is little opportunity to learn how they work.

In addition, many of the actions of the government do tend, whether intentionally or not, to hurt them and to benefit the more well-to-do citizens. The clearest case in point is the redevelopment of the West End itself, which took their homes to construct apartments for the wealthy few. In earlier years, West Enders could see that the city tore down part of the nearby North End—where some West Enders had grown up—in order to build an expressway that aided the suburban residents who drove downtown to work or shop. They also saw that the quality of municipal services on Beacon Hill was much better than in the West End. In 1958 they had only to read the papers to learn that the Mayor was planning to accept a well-paying position with a local insurance company after his retirement, and that this company, which was planning a huge redevelopment project elsewhere in Boston, had been able to get a liberal tax reduction as an incentive.

Moreover, despite the inroads of civil service, city governments still are run to a considerable extent by methods that seem to validate the West Ender’s conceptions. This is particularly true in Boston, where traditional political machine methods have not given way to reform, and where nepotism and graft are still accepted as normal and inevitable. Even when reform movements have taken control over government operations, they rarely have time to do more than make changes at the higher echelons. West Enders, however, come into contact with only the lowest echelons of the government. Whereas they do not know department heads or police commissioners, they do know, or know of, policemen, building inspectors, and laborers who work for the city. For example, many West Enders play the numbers, and since “policy” is controlled by Italian elements, they have fairly reliable evidence that payoffs are made to allow the policy wheels to operate. Also, they know that some policemen sell parking spaces on downtown streets at regular monthly rates. Consequently, it is not difficult to understand why they believe the police to be “legal racketeers” who take payoffs whenever they can. The final proof of the correctness of their view is that the higher graft payoffs go to the top police echelons, and that the men who walk the beat get little or nothing from the large amounts of money that are distributed. In government, as in business, the big money goes not to the little man but to the boss.

Middle-class people have a much different type of contact with their city governments. They rarely find themselves inside a police station, and, if they work for the city, they are employed in the middle or higher levels of the bureaucracy. Most of the time, they see only the performance of civic progress and democracy that the government puts on for their benefit. Rarely do they go behind the scenes where the operations that actually keep the city running are taking place. Even when they do, they are able to maintain the kind of detachment that allows them to pay small bribes to a traffic policeman without feeling guilty or outraged about corruption. Not only do they have little direct contact with corruption, but most important, their contact is limited to those times when they are the beneficiaries.

The West Enders more often are found behind the scenes, either as employees, or as friends and relatives of employees. They are hired or turned down for patronage jobs, and may work on city construction projects. Thus, when bribes are passed, illegal influence employed, and shoddy materials used in construction, they are closer to the evidence than the middle-class person. They confront corruption every day, and see others gain by it, without reaping any benefit from it themselves.

Consequently, the West Enders’ theory of government is frequently supported because they are closer to the seamy side of city operations. Nevertheless, they also hold to the theory even in the absence of such evidence. Thus, they not only expect to find corruption and wrongdoings before the evidence is available, but may reject contrary evidence even when it is available. For example, the city’s decision to give the aforementioned insurance company a tax reduction was an incentive to still the company’s doubt about proceeding with the project—not a result of the job offer made to the Mayor. Likewise, most of the city’s actions in the redevelopment process reflected federal and local regulations, rather than the immoral motives of city officials.

As a result, the belief that the outside world is harmful can blind the West Enders to its beneficial acts. In the West End for example, they failed to see that the police often kept adolescent misbehavior off the police blotter, and that caretakers genuinely wanted to be of assistance. Nor did they see, during the redevelopment, that relocation officials sometimes went out of their way to help people who could not help themselves. This blindness has had undesirable consequences for both parties. The West Enders play it safe by minimizing relationships with government officials. The latter interpret this hesitancy—and the distorted view of motives—as insult or personal rejection, and consider West Enders to be ungrateful citizens.
**ASA SCHEDULE**

**Friday August 1**

6:30pm: Political Sociology Section Reception, Alumni Center at Northeastern U., 6th floor of Columbus Place, 716 Columbus Avenue, Northeastern University ([http://www.northeastern.edu/campusmap/map/interactive.html](http://www.northeastern.edu/campusmap/map/interactive.html)).

**Saturday August 2 Building: Sheraton Boston**

8:30-10:10: Ethno-Racial Diversity, Civic Engagement, and the Politics of Redistribution. Organizer: Irene Bloemraad

Cybell Fox, “The Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and City-Level Spending on Public and Private Outdoor Relief in the United States, 1929”


Robert Andersen and Scott Milligan, “Immigrant Status and Voluntary Association Membership in Canada: Individual and Contextual Effects”

Jan Duyvendak, Menno Hurenkamp, and Evelien Tonkens, “Citizenship in the Netherlands: Locally Produced, Nationally Contested”

10:30-11:30: Roundtables. Organizer: Denise Scott

11:30-12:10: Business Meeting

12:30-2:10: Political Sociology and Political Science: How Similar? How Different? Organizer: John Skrentny

Panelists:

- Edwin Amenta, "Limited Engagement Only: The Practice and Possibilities of Collaboration between Political Sociologists and Political Scientists"
- Peter Evans, "Institutions, Power and Interests in Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Sociology"
- Jennifer Hochschild, "How Can We Distinguish among Poaching, Slumming, and Interdisciplinarity?"
- Jeff Manza, "How Political Sociology Invented Voting Studies, and Why Political Science Took It Over"
- Kim Williams, "Overlaps and Disconnects: Race and Social Movements in Political Sociology and Political Science"

2:30-4:10: Politics at Work. Organizer: Bruce Western

Panelists:

- Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage, and Alexandra Kalev, "It Takes Two: How Affirmative Action Oversight Catalyzed Corporate Fair Employment Practices."
- Vincent Roscigno, "The Micro-Politics of Power, Structure and Abuse on the Shop Floor."
- Beverly Silver, "World Politics on the Shop Floor."

**Sunday August 3 Building: Sheraton Boston**

8:30-10:10: The Comparative Political Sociology of Welfare States. Organizer: Thomas Janoski


Catherine I. Bolzendahl, “Unintended Consequences? How Policymakers Do Gender in Germany, Sweden and the United States.”


Discussant: Mark S. Mizruchi

Simone Polillo, “States, Money and the Reputational Work of Elites”


**DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS**

**Suzanna M. Crage, Indiana University, “The Development of Refugee Policy in Berlin and Munich: Local Responses to a Global Process.”**

Germany is a major host country to refugees, but the state has restricted its asylum policies as the number of asylum seekers has increased. Scholars have analyzed this development at the federal level; local policies, however, have received little attention. I compare the development of refugee aid policies from 1986-2004 in Berlin and Munich. Using archival, interview and observational data, I find very different policymaker preferences and policy development in the two cities. Local governments acted on different cultural ideas about refugees and had different city-level structural considerations. I examine how these interacted to lead to contrasting models of caring for and integrating asylum seekers. I find that ideas had a stronger influence on policy decisions in Munich than in Berlin, and I suggest factors that more generally increase the influence of ideas on policy outcomes. I also consider the limits of federal-level analysis for understanding nation-state responses to the challenge of increasing global immigration.

**Jon Agnone, University of Washington, “Racial Inequality in Wealth: Do Labor Unions Matter?”**

Extant scholarship has identified the paths of black/white wealth inequality to be due to racial discrimination in the housing market, differences in saving and investment behavior, status attainment, and life course processes. A separate area of scholarly inquiry has highlighted the importance of labor unions in raising wages, improving the working environment, and increasing access to pensions. Since blacks experience greater wage returns under labor union contracts than do whites—which helps to narrow the wage gap between blacks and whites—it is possible that labor union employment may also help ameliorate the well-documented black/white wealth gap. If so, then labor unions are positively contributing to the life chances of working class black families and can therefore be rightfully conceived as positive contributors in the struggle against racial and economic injustice. Representing the synthesis of disparate research areas, I use panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to determine whether, and if so how, labor union employment mitigates the black/white wealth gap in the U.S. Even though union representation has decreased over this period, unions may be limiting wealth inequality among a select cross-section of the U.S. population by increasing access to the accumulation of pension wealth, as well as allowing greater home ownership due to the increased wage and non-wage packages of union employees. Further, the individual wealth holdings of African Americans may benefit more than any other racial or ethnic group under union employment given their overrepresentation in unions historically and contemporaneously. Representing the nexus of several areas of inquiry, this project will be of interest to scholars of labor unions, wealth and poverty, race and inequality, as well as labor activists, organizers and leaders.

**Jennifer Christian, Indiana University, “Understanding Policy Change: Public Opinion, Media Discourse, and Presidential Authority.”**

Previous work on policymaking often is limited to a specific case, policy domain, or point in time. Moreover, few scholars incorporate more than one mode of influence in their models. In contrast, this dissertation will extend scholarship on policymaking by looking at several different policy domains, over time, and include three key forms of influence: Presidential authority, mass opinion, and the media. Specifically, this dissertation will investigate how mass opinion, elite influence, and media representations influence health, crime, and social security policy in the United States between 1980 and 2006. Early findings suggest that partisanship is nearly indistinguishable in presidential speeches and the issue of crime, healthcare, and social security are second only to economic policy with respect to the amount of time Presidents devote to speaking on these issues during their State of the Union Address.

**Kendra S. Schiffman, Northwestern University, “Voting Rights and Gender Politics: Suffrage Movement Activism, State Formation, and Expanding Democracy.”**

In the major comparative studies of democratic political systems and transitions to democracy, adult suffrage for white men has generally been the standard of inclusiveness without considering women’s suffrage, with few exceptions. As a result, major theories of democratization emphasize the role of industrialization and class politics to explain the expansion of men’s voting rights and discount women’s enfranchisement as a critical aspect of democratic development. To begin expanding democratization theory to include an explanation of women’s enfranchisement, I compare 48 state polities within the United States using event history analysis, and join the theoretical work of historical institutionalists about institutional governance and party politics with social movement theory of political opportunity structures. My findings demonstrate that there are greater opportunities for expanding democracy to include women at moments when political institutions are new, such as at the time of state government formation. The process of enfranchising women in the U.S. is not fully expounded by the predominant explanations of expanding men’s suffrage, in that industrialization and economic factors are not central in explaining the adoption of women’s full voting rights. Finally, my results reveal that there are more possibilities for expanding voting rights in politics with practices that allow greater direct participation in the political process. Adopting more democratic practices creates political traditions more consistent with the expansion of political rights to previously excluded groups when they collectively organize to demand inclusion.
BOOK ABSTRACTS


Using Ghana as a case study, Fallon examines the specific processes women are using to bring about political change. She assesses information gathered from interviews and surveys conducted in Ghana and assays the existing literature to provide a focused look at how women have become involved in the democratization of sub-Saharan nations. The narrative traces the history of democratic institutions in the region—from the imposition of male-dominated mechanisms by western states to latter-day reforms that reflect the active resurgence of women's political power within many African cultures—to show how women have made significant recent political gains in Ghana and other emerging democracies. Fallon attributes these advances to a combination of forces, including the decline of the authoritarian state and its attendant state-run women's organizations, newly formed constitutions, and newfound access to good-governance funding. She draws the study into the larger debate over gendered networking and democratic reform by exploring how gender roles affect and are affected by the state in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. In demonstrating how women's activism is evolving with and shaping democratization across the region, Democracy and the Rise of Women’s Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa reveals how women’s social movements are challenging the barriers created by colonization and dictatorships in Africa and beyond.


A no-nonsense treatment of information operations, this handbook makes clear what does and does not fall under information operations, how the military plans and executes such efforts, and what the role of IO ought to be in the "war of ideas." The book provides detailed accounts of the doctrine and practice of the five core information operations capabilities (psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations) and the three "related" capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). The discussion of each capability includes historical examples, explanations of tools and forces available, and current challenges faced by that community. Paul argues that contemporary IO's mixing of capabilities focused on information content with those focused on information systems conflates "apples" with the "apple carts." The study concludes that information operations would be better poised to contribute to the war of ideas if IO were reorganized, separating content capabilities from systems capabilities and separating the employment of "black" (deceptive or falsely attributed) information from "white" (wholly truthful and correctly attributed) information.


The vast majority of works on media bias, both popular and academic, have been based on anecdotal evidence. Media Bias? addresses the question; to what extent can the news media be characterized as “conservative” or liberal? The study involves a systematic comparative analysis of the coverage of major domestic social issues between 1975 and 2000 by two mainstream newsmagazines, Time and Newsweek, and by two explicitly partisan publications, National Review (conservative) and Progressive (liberal). Before answering the questions of media biased, several related issues are discussed. What does “bias” mean? How can the ideological bias of mainstream news media be measured empirically? Does media bias vary by issue or change over time? How important are information sources in shaping the news? Does historical context, such as presidential administration or dramatic, politically relevant events, affect media bias? The consequences of media bias are also considered. These include the possibility that some biased accounts of social issues can perform several positive functions for the maintenance and vitality of political democracy.


The gap between the richest and poorest Americans has grown steadily over the last thirty years, and economic inequality is on the rise in many other industrialized democracies as well. But the magnitude and pace of the increase differs dramatically across nations. A country’s political system and its institutions play a critical role in determining levels of inequality in a society. In Democracy, Inequality, and Representation, distinguished political scientists and economists use a set of international databases to examine the political causes and consequences of income inequality. The contributors to this comparative study of the foundations of inequality point to several mechanisms driving these relationships: economic institutions, such as the organization of labor markets, political institutions, such as the type of electoral system, and the partisan bias in office over the long term are some of the key determinants of cross national differences in inequality profiles taken on in this volume. Noting that traditional economic models fail to account for the striking variations in inequality, the authors show how different combinations among these factors lead to very different outcomes. But Democracy, Inequality, and Representation does not stop here. It also goes on to argue that there is a causal feedback that needs to be explored by comparative analysis, namely that inequality itself

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shapes political systems and institutions in powerful and often overlooked ways. Thus, contributors also examine how inequality shapes the democratic process. The book focuses, among other things, on how disparity mutes political voices; on how uncertainty in the economy changes voters’ attitudes; and on how changes in levels of inequality can drive reforms in political institutions themselves. The contributors to this important new volume skillfully disentangle a series of complex relationships between economics and politics to show how inequality both shapes and is shaped by policy. Democracy, Inequality, and Representation provides deeply nuanced insight into why some democracies are able to curtail inequality—while others continue to witness a division that grows ever deeper.


Today the United States has one of the highest poverty rates among the world’s rich industrial democracies. Brian Steensland shows us that things might have turned out differently. During the 1960s and 1970s, policymakers in three presidential administrations tried to replace the existing welfare system with a revolutionary program to guarantee Americans basic economic security. This episode has largely vanished from the nation’s collective memory. Here, Steensland tells the whole story for the first time, ranging from why such an unlikely policy idea developed in the first place to the factors that sealed its fate. His account, based on extensive original research in presidential archives, draws from mainstream social scientific perspectives that emphasize the role of powerful stakeholder groups and policymaking institutions in shaping policy development. But Steensland also shows that some of the most potent obstacles to guaranteed income plans were cultural. Most centrally, by challenging Americans’ longstanding distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor, the plans threatened the nation’s cultural, political, and economic status quo.

**Margaret R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2008).**

As market fundamentalism has moved from the margins of debate to global doctrine, three decades of market-driven governance is transforming growing numbers of rights-bearing citizens into socially excluded internally stateless persons. Against this perilous movement to organize society exclusively by market principles, Margaret Somers argues that the fragile project of sustaining socially inclusive democratic rights requires the countervailing powers of a social state, a robust public sphere to hold it accountable, and a relationally sturdy civil society. In this original and path-breaking work, from historical epistemologies of social capital and naturalism, to contested narratives of civil society and the public sphere, to Hurricane Katrina’s racial apartheid, Somers alerts us that the growing moral authority of the market is distorting the meaning of citizenship from noncontractual shared fate to conditional privilege, making rights, inclusion and moral worth dependent on contractual market value. Genealogies of Citizenship advances an innovative view of rights as necessary public goods rooted in an alliance of public power, political membership and social practices of equal moral recognition—in short, the right to have rights.

**Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies (University of Chicago Press, 2007).**

The world’s richer democracies all provide such public benefits as pensions and health care, but why are some far more generous than others? And why, in the face of globalization and fiscal pressures, has the welfare state not been replaced by another model? Reconsidering the myriad issues raised by such pressing questions, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza contend here that public opinion has been an important, yet neglected, factor in shaping welfare states in recent decades. Analyzing data on sixteen countries, Brooks and Manza find that the preferences of citizens profoundly influence the welfare policies of their governments and the behavior of politicians in office. Shaped by slow-moving forces such as social institutions and collective memories, these preferences have counteracted global pressures that many commentators assumed would lead to the welfare state’s demise. Moreover, Brooks and Manza show that cross-national differences in popular support help explain why Scandinavian social democracies offer so much more than liberal democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Significantly expanding our understanding of both public opinion and social policy in the world’s most developed countries, this landmark study will be essential reading for scholars of political economy, public opinion, and democratic theory.

**Jon Shefner, Democratization and Community Mobilization in Low Income Mexico (Penn State University Press, 2008).**

This book is based on eleven years of fieldwork in a poor community on the outskirts of Guadalajara, Mexico. Those years were a period of extensive change in Mexico, as political democratization was instituted during a period of unrelenting neoliberal globalization. The political economy of neoliberalism, Shefner argues, opened alternatives to the community organization, limiting state spending prerogatives and created a political environment in which diverse organizations worked together across class and status lines to achieve common goals. Positive changes in political process, however, did not translate into gains for the neighborhoods, as later periods of fieldwork demonstrated little material progress for the community. The lack of material progress despite a coalesced opposition suggests that theories regarding the contribution of civil society are unduly optimistic and analytically problematic. The coalescing of poor and middle class organizations appeared to be the quintessential case of

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civil society mobilizing for common cause. However, an internal hierarchy privileged organizations representing higher class and status constituencies over their poor counterparts. Decisions over strategy and goals were imposed by the more powerful organizations. After the transition to electoral democracy, the coalition broke apart, leaving the organization of the poor without their allies. These experiences show the unity of civil society is illusory at best; that societal hierarchy is re-created even in progressive coalitions, and that those disadvantaged groups that enter into civil society activity may be no less disadvantaged when struggles end.

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